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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three essays in the fields of public and behavioral economics with a
special focus on social preferences using both lab and field experiments. The first essay investigates
the impact that information about the value of a public good has on voluntary contributions. It is
costly for organizations to provide detailed information about their projects. Thus, organizations
would ideally like to spend their resources on information provision only if it would help increase
the contributions. We find that the impact of information depends on the generosity level of the
population. While providing more information increases average contributions in a relatively less
generous donor population, it actually hurts contributions in a relatively more generous population.
Thus, these findings suggest targeting information provision towards less generous donor groups.
The second essays studies the impact that scarcity of resources has on cheating and in-group
favoritism using a two-stage lab-in-the-field experiment with low-income coffee farmers in a small,
isolated village in Guatemala. Using the distinctive variance in income that comes from seasonal
coffee harvesting, we first conducted our experiment before the harvest (Scarcity period) and then
during the harvest season (Abundance period). First, we find that subjects cheat at high levels in
both periods when they are the beneficiary of the cheating. Scarcity does not impact this cheating
behavior. Secondly, we find significant in-group favoritism towards fellow villagers for cheating in
the Abundance period, which disappears during the Scarcity period. Finally, using a dictator game,
we show that this finding holds even when the cost of favoring an in-group member is monetary.
The last essay studies whether workers exert more effort when they work for a mission-oriented
job using a modified gift-exchange experiment. We find that workers exert more effort when they
work for a non-profit organization rather than a for-profit one, but only for high wages. Thus,
higher wages generate significantly higher profits in the non-profit firm compared to the for-profit
firm. We contribute to the literature by studying how intrinsic motivations may impact effort
choices in the workplace.
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation includes three essays in the fields of public economics and behavioral eco-
nomics with a special focus on social preferences using both lab and field experiments.
Most donors make contributions to public goods without doing any research. Organizations that
aim to increase cooperation can encourage more informed giving by providing more and detailed
information. However, information provision is costly and organizations have limited resources.
So, it is important to consider the benefits of such provision. The first essay investigates the capac-
ity of information to increase public good contributions. We examine the impact of information
provision on voluntary contributions to a linear public good with an uncertain individual bene-
fit (i.e. uncertain marginal per-capita return (MPCR)). Uninformed subjects make contribution
decisions based only on the expected MPCR (i.e. the prior distribution), while informed subjects
observe the realized MPCR before contributing. Using a theoretical model of other-regarding pref-
erences, we find that the impact of information on average contributions crucially depends on the
generosity level of the population, modeled as a stochastic increase in the pro-social preferences.
In particular, a less generous population substantially increases contributions in response to good
news of higher than expected MPCR and reduces contributions relatively little in response to bad
news of lower than expected MPCR. Thus, the overall impact of information is to increase average
contributions when the population is less generous. The opposite is true for a more generous pop-
ulation. We test these theoretical predictions using a two-stage lab experiment. First, we measure
subjects’ levels of generosity in the public good game using an online experiment. Then using
the data collected in the online experiment, we control for the level of generosity in the lab. Our
findings are in line with the theoretical predictions, and suggest that a more targeted information
provision may be a successful strategy to improve contributions to public goods.
The second essay studies the impact of scarcity on cheating and in-group favoritism using a
two-stage lab-in-the-field experiment with low-income coffee farmers in a small, isolated village
in Guatemala. During the coffee harvesting months, farmers in this village experience a significant
1
income boost from selling their coffee beans. However, during the non-harvesting months, they
experience a substantial decline in income, inducing a pronounced state of scarcity, while other
factors remain similar. Using this variance in income, we first conducted our experiment before
the coffee harvest (Scarcity), then repeated the experiment with the same group of subjects during
the harvest season (Abundance). First, using the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) die-roll
paradigm, we find that subjects cheat at high levels in both periods when they are the beneficiaries
of the cheating. Scarcity does not impact this cheating behavior. Secondly, using subjects’ natu-
ral village identity, we find significant in-group favoritism for cheating in the Abundance period,
which disappears during the Scarcity period. Finally, using a dictator game, we show that this
finding holds when the cost of favoring an in-group member is monetary rather than moral.
When workers decide on the effort level to exert, they take many factors into account, including
not only extrinsic factors, such as the salary, but also the type of work and the mission of the
organization. In the third essay, we study whether workers exert more effort when they work for
a mission-oriented job using a modified gift-exchange experiment. In our experiment, there are
workers, managers and firm owners. Managers decide how much to pay to their workers, and
observing this, workers decide how much effort to provide. These decisions determine the profits
created for the firm. Firm owners receive a share of the profits along with the managers. There are
two treatments: profit and non-profit. The difference between these treatments is the identity of
the firm owner. In the profit treatment, the firm owner is another student in the lab who has been
randomly selected to be a firm owner and does not make any decisions but collects their share of
the profits. In the non-profit treatment, the firm owner is a non-profit organization. At the end of
this treatment, the accumulated earnings for the non-profit organization are donated online. While
we find that managers’ behavior across the two treatments is similar, workers exert more effort in
the non-profit treatment when the wage paid is high. This results in more profits being generated in
the non-profit treatment at high wage levels. We contribute to the literature by studying how other
motivations, such as altruism, may greatly impact effort choices in the workplace, particularly
when the job involves doing good.
2
2. WHEN DOES LESS INFORMATION TRANSLATE INTO MORE GIVING TO PUBLIC
GOODS?
2.1 Introduction
Private voluntary contributions have been increasingly viewed as a vital source of funding for
public goods. For example, DonorsChoose, a fundraising platform for public school projects, has
quickly gained popularity since its inception in 2000 and has raised close to $640 million up-to-
date.1,2 Other crowdfunding platforms that fundraise for public projects include Public Good3, Ra-
zoo4, and Pledge Music5. Interestingly, while the non-profit sector is growing, with the number of
non-profits surpassing 1.5 million, recent evidence suggests that individual donors are often poorly
informed when making contributions. According to 2015 Camber Collective survey about private
charitable giving in the U.S., “49% of donors don’t know how nonprofits use their money”.6 Such
lack of information may have a significant effect on contributions if donors care about the impact
of their giving. Lab experiments find that this is indeed the case with subjects contributing higher
amounts to more valuable projects (see Ledyard et al., 1995 and Cooper and Kagel, 2016). This
suggests that donors would respond to more information by increasing contributions upon finding
out good news of higher than expected value of the public project and decrease contributions upon
observing bad news of lower than expected value. Thus, the overall impact of more information
on expected giving depends crucially on the relative response to good and bad news.
In this paper, we investigate theoretically and experimentally the impact of more information on
total contributions in the context of a linear public good game with an uncertain return. We restrict
our attention to public goods whose provision is always desirable from a social standpoint but free-
1For more information, visit https://www.donorschoose.org/about.
2According to Charity Navigator, the overall contributions to education related
causes in the US amounted to $59.77 billion in 2016. For more information, see
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42.
3www.publicgood.com
4www.razoo.com
5https://www.pledgemusic.com/
6See http://www.cambercollective.com/moneyforgood/
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riding incentives are present at the individual level. The public good provided increases linearly
with total contributions, and the magnitude of this increase depends on the marginal per-capita
return (MPCR) of the public good. To determine the impact of information about the MPCR, we
consider two information environments corresponding to informed and uninformed populations.
With an uninformed population, subjects do not know the realized value of the MPCR, but only
know its prior distribution when making a contribution decision. With an informed population,
subjects observe the realized MPCR prior to contributing. This allows us to compare uninformed
and informed giving by studying how subjects respond to good and bad news about the MPCR.
On the theory side, the linear structure of the public good implies that for any value of the
MPCR, it is socially optimal to contribute all of the endowment, while it is individually payoff
maximizing to contribute nothing. Since lab experiments reveal that most of the contributions are
in-between the two extremes (Ledyard et al., 1995; Cooper and Kagel, 2016), we incorporate other-
regarding preferences into the agents’ utility function in spirit of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012).
In particular, agents are assumed to have pro-social motivations for giving, captured by agents’
preference for higher average contributions to the public good. We refer to agents with stronger
pro-social preferences as more generous since they have stronger propensity to contribute. In
addition, agents exhibit fairness concerns, which are captured by a dis-utility from contributing
a higher amount than the average contributions by others. In equilibrium, contributions increase
with the MPCR and the generosity level of the agent.
Interestingly, we find that the impact of information on expected contributions crucially de-
pends on the generosity level of the agent population, modeled as a stochastic increase in the
pro-social preferences. While information has the potential of increasing average contributions
for a less generous population, it may in fact reduce average contributions when the population
is more generous. The reason for this is in the differential response to good and bad news in the
two population types. For both types, the equilibrium contributions decrease upon observing bad
news of lower than expected MPCR and increase upon observing good news of higher than ex-
pected MPCR. Moreover, the equilibrium contributions feature increasing returns to MPCR when
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the MPCR is low (i.e. contributions are a convex function of the MPCR for low values) and di-
minishing returns when the MPCR is high (i.e. contributions are a concave function of the MPCR
for high values). This is because at low MPCR, an increase in the marginal return induces a large
number of agents to contribute, generating a substantial increase in overall giving. In contrast, at
high MPCR, a further increase induces a relatively small response since most agents are already
contributing large amounts and thus are less willing to further increase their giving. However, a
more generous population reaches diminishing returns faster since most of the agents are giving
significant amounts even at lower values of the MPCR. As a result, a more generous population is
less responsive to good news and more responsive to bad news and thus information has an over-
all negative effect on expected contributions. The opposite is true for a less generous population,
which features increasing returns for a wider range of the MPCR and thus is more responsive to
good news than bad news.
The novel findings of our model give rise to testable hypotheses, which we experimentally in-
vestigate in the lab. Since our theoretical model suggests that the generosity level of the population
plays a vital role in how donors respond to information, a defining feature of our experimental
design is controlling for the generosity level of the sessions. We accomplish this by running our
experiment in two stages. First, we conduct an online experiment to elicit subjects’ generosity
levels in the public good game prior to the lab experiment. Using this data, we create more and
less generous groups in the lab, and inform the subjects about the generosity level of their session
by using a neutral language. Subjects play a linear public good game in groups of three with un-
certain MPCR (either high (0.60) or low (0.40) with equal probability). There are two information
treatments. In the informed treatment, subjects know the randomly chosen MPCR before they
make their contribution decisions. In the uninformed treatment, they are only informed about the
distribution of the MPCR, and asked to make their contributions without knowing which MPCR is
chosen.
The experimental findings are in line with the theoretical predictions. In the sessions with more
generous subjects, average contributions in the uninformed treatment are significantly higher than
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the ones in the informed treatment. Subjects’ contribution level in the uninformed treatment is
closer to the contribution level in the informed treatment under good news (MPCR of 0.60) than
under bad news (MPCR of 0.40). Thus on average, information reduces contributions to the public
good in the relatively more generous sessions. The opposite is true for the less generous sessions.
Uninformed contributions to the public good are closer to the informed contributions under bad
news than under good news. Thus, information is good for giving in the relatively less generous
sessions.
The findings of this study have significant implications for fundraising. They suggest that
targeted information provision may be a successful strategy that improves contributions to public
goods. In particular, the model and experimental results reveal that less generous donors are more
responsive to good news about the returns to public goods. Thus, focusing on better informing
these donors, who are often overlooked in fundraising campaigns, may be a more fruitful strategy
than uniform information provision.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper connects two research strands that investigate factors that impact public good provi-
sion and cooperation: 1) information, 2) social preference composition of groups. In the following
section, we briefly review the related literature.
2.2.1 Information
Much of the earlier literature on public good provision assumes that donors operate under
complete and perfect information (Ledyard et al., 1995; Andreoni and Payne, 2013; Vesterlund,
2016). In reality, however, information is often limited, which has given rise to a more recent trend
of studying public good provision under incomplete and imperfect information.
On the theoretical front, there is sparse literature that studies public good provision under
incomplete information about the public good’s value. In particular, in the context of discrete
public goods, Menezes et al. (2001), Laussel and Palfrey (2003), and Barbieri and Malueg (2008,
2010) introduce private information about donors’ heterogeneous valuations of the public good,
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while Krasteva and Yildirim (2013) endogenize the choice of information acquisition and find that
more information about one’s own value improves giving. In contrast, our current setting features
a public good with homogeneous returns and finds that more information about the return is not
always beneficial.
Our paper is closer to the literature on continuous public goods under incomplete information,
which has modeled the public good as having uncertain (but homogeneous) returns (e.g. Vester-
lund, 2003; Andreoni, 2006; Lange et al., 2017). This literature, however, has mainly focused on
the information transmission about the quality of the public good to uninformed donors via lead-
ership giving (Vesterlund, 2003; Andreoni, 2006) 7 or costly gift provision to donors Lange et al.
(2017). Instead, our focus here is on studying the impact of more information on average total
provision.
Our model and experimental set-up is cast as a continuous linear public good with uncertain
MPCR. In this respect, our paper is closest to the experimental literature that considers limited in-
formation about the returns. Although some of this literature focuses on information about others’
valuation and/or endowment by incorporating heterogeneity in a non-linear public good environ-
ment (e.g. Marks and Croson, 1999; Chan et al., 1999), most of the focus has been on the impact of
uncertainty about the MPCR. In particular, Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), Levati et al. (2009),
Fischbacher et al. (2014), Stoddard et al. (2015), Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017), Butera and List (2017)
and Théroude and Zylbersztejn (2017) study how increasing the riskiness of the returns, in terms
of mean preserving spread, affects contributions. Although the findings are mixed, Levati and Mo-
rone (2013) and Stoddard (2017) show that the parameterization of the public good game can play
an important role in determining the direction of this effect.
In contrast, we are interested in the impact of information about the MPCR on contributions.
Because of that, we keep the distribution of the MPCR fixed and vary the amount of information
that people receive, which more closely represents people’s response to information. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate public good contributions in this environment.
7Potters et al. (2005, 2007) experimentally investigate the information revelation through leadership giving.
7
It is worth highlighting that our work is also related to an emerging literature studying the
role of information on charitable giving. Most of this literature studies the impact of variety
of information (such as cost-to-donation ratio, recipients’ or non-profits’ characteristics, or other
donors’ giving and so on) on donations (e.g. Eckel et al., 2007; Shang and Croson, 2009; Fong
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011; Null, 2011; Karlan and Wood, 2014; Exley, 2015, 2017; Metzger and
Günther, 2015; Brown et al., 2017; Butera and Horn, 2017; Portillo and Stinn, 2018). In many of
these studies, however, donors’ beliefs in the absence of information are unobservable and outside
the experimenter’s control. In reality, donors may adopt different beliefs about non-profits’ charac-
teristics. Some may hold very optimistic beliefs, while others may hold very pessimistic beliefs in
absence of sufficient information. Thus, donors’ response to information is ambiguous and heav-
ily influenced by their prior beliefs. Without means of controlling for these beliefs, it is difficult
to gain a deeper insight into the channels through which information impacts giving. Indeed, the
findings of the existing studies are mixed, with donors sometimes using information to tailor their
donations up or down.
To gain more insight into the impact of information on donors’ giving, we control both for the
information that donors receive and the interpretation of this information by donors. To accom-
plish this, we use the linear public good game, in which subjects are assigned their valuations for
the public good by the experimenter and compensated based on these assigned values. By vary-
ing people’s information about their induced values (Smith, 1976), we are able to determine how
they respond to information about the value and how the informed contributions compare to the
uninformed contributions.
Finally, there is also charitable giving research studying how donors may strategically create a
"moral wiggle room" (Dana et al., 2007) to justify selfish behavior. For example, research shows
how donors use risk (Exley, 2015), ambiguity (Haisley and Weber, 2010), beliefs about others
(Di Tella et al., 2015), and performance metrics (Exley, 2017) as an excuse not to give. Unlike
our public goods framework, most of these studies use a dictator game type of environment where
subjects are given an endowment and asked to make a donation. In this respect, our study is more
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representative of cooperation rather than altruism. Additionally, in our study subjects are either
exogenously informed or uninformed depending on the treatment. Thus, information avoidance
as an excuse not to give is not a viable explanation for our findings. Granted, it is plausible that
subjects in the uninformed treatment could use the lack of information as an excuse not to give
despite knowing that each MPCR is equally likely. Although this could provide an alternative
explanation for our findings in the less generous sessions, it fails to explain the behavior observed
in more generous sessions.8
2.2.2 Social Preferences Composition of Groups
The second strand of related literature studies social preferences (i.e. other-regarding prefer-
ences) for giving. This literature has established that people have different motivations for giving
and they can be classified into different types based on these motivations (see the following sur-
veys: Camerer, 2011; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Cooper and Kagel, 2016). While some people are
selfish and do not give anything, others are conditional cooperators whose contributions depend on
what others give (e.g. Brandts and Schram, 2001; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kurzban and Houser,
2005).
Groups consist of individuals with different social preferences (i.e. types). The existing liter-
ature mainly focuses on how group composition changes the level of cooperation and finds that
the composition of social preference types in groups matters in achieving and maintaining high
levels of cooperation (e.g. Burlando and Guala, 2005; de Oliveira et al., 2015; Gächter and Thöni,
2005; Page et al., 2005; Gächter, 2006; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2007; Ones and Putterman, 2007).
One common finding in this literature is that contributions are higher in homogeneous groups with
members who are more generous. Moreover, the existence of one selfish person in the group is
enough to harm the groups’ ability to cooperate (de Oliveira et al., 2015).
Our theoretical model suggests that people’s reaction to information depends on the level of
generosity of their group (more in Section 2.3). We contribute to this research strand by studying
8If moral wiggle room is an explanation for our findings, it is not clear to us why it may yield different results
across treatments. Potentially, it is possible that information may be changing the social norms differently in more and
less generous sessions. Since this is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this to future research.
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the impact of information across two groups with different levels of generosity. Finally, it is im-
portant to note that our findings about the impact of group composition on response to information
might also explain the mixed results regarding the impact of information on giving in the charitable
giving literature.
2.3 Theory and Hypotheses
The linear public good environment consists of groups of N ≥ 2 agents. Each agent i is en-
dowed with wealth W and chooses an amount gi to allocate to a public good that benefits everyone
equally in their groups. The monetary payoff of agent i is
Mi = W − gi + v
N∑
k=1
gk
where v ∈ ( 1
N
, 1) denotes the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) of the public good. Clearly,
the payoff maximizing strategy is gi = 0 and the socially optimal strategy is gi = W . Therefore, in
absence of other-regarding preferences all agents contribute zero in the unique Nash equilibrium.
Since the above equilibrium behavior is a drastic departure from the experimental evidence
(see Ledyard et al., 1995), the existing literature has considered the possibility of other-regarding
preferences (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and
Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Arifovic and Ledyard, 2012). In particular, following
the model of inequality aversion by Arifovic and Ledyard (2012)9, agent i’s utility function is given
by
ui(Mi,M) = Mi + βiM − γi max{M −Mi, 0} (2.1)
where M = 1
N
∑N
k=1Mk is the average earnings in the game. The agent-specific parameter
βi captures the agent’s preference for higher average earnings. In other words, βi is the strength
9We adopt the preference specification proposed by Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) since it most closely fits our
public good framework. However, the utility function given by eq. (2.1) is closely related to alternative preference
specifications proposed by the existing literature (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Char-
ness and Rabin (2002)), with utility representations that are equivalent up to linear transformations of one another. For
further discussion of this equivalence, see Arifovic and Ledyard (2012).
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of i’s pro-social motives for giving which we refer to as the individual i’s generosity level10. The
parameter γi captures her inequality aversion, which generates disutility if i’s earnings fall below
the average.
Letting g(v) denote the expected average giving in the public good game, i’s best response
function is given by
gi =

0 if βi ≤ β1(v)
g(v) if βi ∈ [β1(v), β2(v, γi)]
W if βi ≥ β2(v, γi)
(2.2)
where
β1(v) =
N(1− v)
Nv − 1
, β2(v, γi) =
N(1− v)
Nv − 1
+ γi
N − 1
Nv − 1
.
The best response function reveals that selfish agents (low βi) give 0, highly generous agents
(high βi) give all their endowment, and moderately generous agents (intermediate βi) are condi-
tional cooperators and match the expected average contributions by others.
Given this best response function, the expected equilibrium giving solves
g(v) = Pr(βi ≥ β2(v, γi))W + Pr(β ∈ [β1(v), β2(v, γi)])g(v), (2.3)
where the total expected giving is simply the weighted average giving of the highly generous
agents, who give all their endowment, and the moderately generous agents, who match the expected
average giving in the population. Rearranging terms, we can re-write eq. (2.3) as
g(v) =
1
1 + Pr(β≤β1(v))
Pr(β≥β2(v,γi))
W (2.4)
Thus, the expected equilibrium giving depends on the relative likelihood of the payoff max-
imizing (selfish) giving and socially optimum (generous) giving, i.e. R(v) = Pr(β≤β1(v))
Pr(β≥β2(v)) . As
10In Arifovic and Ledyard’s paper, this term is referred to as the level of altruism. Due to different definitions of
altruism in the economics and psychology literature, we opt to avoid confusion by referring to βi as the individual’s
generosity.
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expected, the average giving is decreasing in the relative likelihood of selfish giving (i.e. R(v))
since it causes the conditional contributors to adopt more pessimistic beliefs about the average
giving in the population.
To determine how the expected equilibrium giving varies with the MPCR, v, we need to take
into account the distribution of other-regarding preferences since it affects the relative likelihood
of selfish giving, R(v). In particular, in order to focus attention on the comparative statics with
respect to the population’s generosity level, we simplify the model by letting γi = γ be identical
across the population.11 Furthermore, we model the pro-social preferences in the population as
distributed according to an exponential distribution βi ∼ Exp(1/λ) where higher λ represents a
(stochastically) more generous population.12 This specification allows us to conduct comparative
statics with respect to the generosity level of the population, captured succinctly by the parameter
λ.
Given the expected equilibrium giving function and the distribution of pro-social preferences
in the population, the following lemma describes how expected giving varies with the MPCR, v,
and the population’s generosity level λ.
Lemma 1. g(v) is increasing in v ∈
(
1
N
, 1
)
with limv→ 1
N
g(v) = 0 and limv→1 g(v) = W .
Moreover, there exists a unique ṽ(λ) ∈
(
1
N
, 1
]
with the following properties:
1) g′′(v) > 0 for v < ṽ(λ) and g′′(v) < 0 for v > ṽ(λ);
2) ṽ(λ) is decreasing in λ with limλ→0 ṽ(λ) = 1 and limλ→∞ ṽ(λ) = 1N .
The formal proof of Lemma 1 is relegated to Appendix A. Intuitively, it reveals that the equi-
librium giving is increasing in the MPCR since higher v increases the net social benefit of giving,
captured byNv−1, and decreases the individual cost of giving, captured by (1−v). Moreover, ex-
pected giving approaches zero as the net social benefit of giving becomes negligible (i.e. v → 1
N
)
11The results in this section readily generalize to a stochastic inequality aversion parameter γi as long as γi and βi
are independently distributed.
12The exponential distribution gives a convenient way of capturing heterogeneity in pro-social preferences as its
domain covers all non-negative real numbers and the parameter λ allows us to stochastically change the pro-social
preferences of the population in terms of first order stochastic dominance.
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and it approaches W as the marginal cost of giving becomes negligible (i.e. v → 1).
Interestingly, the first property reveals that the marginal benefit of increasing the MPCR is non-
monotone and tends to diminish at higher values of the MPCR. In particular, the average giving
g(v) exhibits increasing returns of higher MPCR for low values (v < ṽ(λ)), but diminishing returns
for high values (v > ṽ(λ)). To grasp the intuition behind these dynamics, note that for low values
(i.e. v < ṽ(λ)), there is a significant number of agents who do not contribute. Thus, raising the
MPCR in this case has an increasing marginal impact as it shifts a growing number of agents away
from selfish to conditional and generous giving. However, this impact of increasing the MPCR
eventually levels off as the number of selfish agents dwindles. Consequently, for high values of
the MPCR (v > ṽ(λ)), the marginal impact of further increasing the MPCR is diminishing as it
induces a smaller number of agents to move away from selfish giving.
The second property further reveals that a more generous population, characterized by a larger
λ, reaches diminishing returns of higher MPCR faste (i.e. ṽ(λ) is decreasing in λ). The reason
is that for a more generous population, composed of individuals with relatively high βi, inducing
most agents to give requires only a modest increase in the MPCR. The opposite is true for a less
generous population, in which significant portion of agents require a large increase in the MPCR
in order to contribute.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a numerical example for two different values of λ (low and high generosity
levels) and provides visual support for Lemma 1.13 It is evident from Figure 2.1 that g(v) is
increasing in v for both generosity levels. While g(v) is convex at low values of v, it is concave
at high values. Moreover, a more generous population (Figure 2.1 (a)) reaches diminishing returns
of higher MPCR faster as illustrated by the fact that it is concave for a wider region of v (i.e.
ṽ(16) < ṽ(6)).
The shape of the giving function described by Lemma 1 has an important implication on the
impact of information provision. To see this, suppose that, as in the experimental design in Section
2.4, the MPCR (v) is drawn from a discrete distribution with v = {vL, vH}, where 1N < vL <
13This numerical example is constructed by using the following parameters: γ = 4, vL = 0.4, vH = 0.6, and
pL = 0.5
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Figure 2.1: Informed and Uninformed Giving
(a) High Generosity (λ = 16) (b) Low Generosity (λ = 6)
vH < 1, and Pr(v = vr) = pr for r = {L,H}.14 In absence of information, the agent’s giving (gU )
is based on the expected MPCR, E[v]. In contrast, an informed agent gives based on the realized
MPCR, v, and thus the expected informed giving (gI) is the weighed average contributions under
high and low MPCR.
gU = g(E[v]); gI = pLg(vL) + pHg(vH) (2.5)
Clearly, information can either decrease giving by revealing low value vL (bad news), or in-
crease giving by revealing high value vH (good news). The relative magnitude of the response
to good and bad news depends of the shape of the giving function described by Lemma 1 and
illustrated in Figure 2.1. In particular, Figure 2.1 (a) illustrates the case of generous population for
which the giving function is mostly in the concave region. It is evident from the figure that expected
equilibrium giving responds more to bad news than good news, i.e. |gU − g(vL)| > |gU − g(vH)|.
14To ease the exposition, we present the theoretical results using a two-point distribution since it corresponds to our
experimental design in Section 2.4, but the theoretical results extend to any arbitrary non-degenerate distribution.
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Consequently, when the population is rather generous, information is on average bad for giving,
i.e. gU > gI . The opposite is true for a more selfish population that is likely to feature a convex
giving function for a wider range of v. Thus, as Figure 2.1 (b) illustrates, the response to good
news in this case is larger than the response to bad news (i.e. |gU − g(vH)| > |gU − g(vL)|), caus-
ing information to be on average beneficial for giving (i.e. gI > gU ). The following Proposition
formalizes this dynamics.
Proposition 1. There exist generosity levels 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 <∞ such that expected informed giving
exceeds uninformed giving for λ ≤ λ1, while uninformed giving exceeds expected informed giving
for λ ≥ λ2.
The proof of Proposition 1 follows immediately from the Jensens’ inequality and is relegated
to Appendix A. The proposition states that while informed giving exceeds uninformed giving for a
less generous population, information is detrimental for giving if the population is more generous.
As discussed above, the key driver for these dynamics is that less generous population is more
responsive to good news than bad news, while the opposite is true for more generous population.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide testable hypotheses that we investigate by using a lab ex-
periment described in Section 2.4. In particular, our experimental design aims to test the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. In a less generous population, the agents’ average response to good news is higher
than their response to bad news.
Hypothesis 2. In a more generous population, the agents’ average response to good news is lower
than their response to bad news.
The implication of Hypothesis 1 is that the average contributions are higher when agents are
informed and thus information is good for giving. Hypothesis 2 implies just the opposite for a
more generous population- average uninformed giving exceeds the informed one and information
is bad for giving. In the next section, we describe the experimental design that we use to test these
hypotheses in the lab.
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2.4 Experimental Design
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to control for the level of generosity in each session. We
do this by conducting the experiment in two stages.15 In Stage 1, we measure subjects’ generosity
level in the public good game by using an online experiment. One to two weeks later, using the
information obtained from Stage 1, we invite some of these participants to the lab to participate in
the second stage of the experiment.
Our experiment is a 2x2 between subjects design16: Selfish vs. Generous and Informed vs.
Uninformed. Using the data collected in Stage 1, we create relatively more and less selfish sessions
in the lab. More specifically, we only invite subjects who were classified as relatively less generous
to the Selfish treatment; and we only invite subjects who were classified as relatively more generous
to the Generous treatment.
In Stage 2, subjects come to the lab to participate in a linear public good game described in
Section 2.3. Subjects are placed in groups of three and play a one shot linear public good game
with uncertain MPCR, which takes values of 0.4 or 0.6 with equal probability. They play the game
for 10 rounds with random rematching. In the Uninformed treatment, subjects make a contribution
decision without knowing which MPCR will be used for that round. However, subjects know that
each outcome of the MPCR is equally likely. In the Informed treatment, subjects are informed
about the realized MPCR for that round when they make their decisions. We pay subjects for one
of the rounds picked at random at the end of the experiment. Finally, they fill out a survey. Below,
we provide detailed information about each stage of the experimental design.
Stage 1: First, invitees receive an invitation email to participate in an incentivized online ex-
periment with a possibility of being invited to an experiment in our lab. The online experiment,
programmed in Qualtrics, consists of Fischbacher et al. (2001) (henceforth FGF) conditional con-
15This aspect of our design is inspired by and similar to Burlando and Guala (2005), Gächter and Thöni (2005), and
de Oliveira et al. (2015).
16We ran the Informed and Uninformed treatments within subjects. Although subjects knew that experiment had
two parts, they did not know anything about the second part when they played the first part. We only report the
data from the first treatment played, since the behavior in the first treatment contaminated the data from the second
treatment (i.e. ordering effect).
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Figure 2.2: Conditional Contribution Table
tribution game. In this game, each subject is endowed with 20 tokens (1 token=$0.40), assigned
to a group consisting of three other members, and asked to play a linear public good game with
an MPCR of 0.50. Each subject makes two decisions: Decision 1 and Decision 2. In Decision 1,
subjects state how many of their tokens, if any, they would like to contribute to a group project (un-
conditional contribution) that benefits everyone in their group equally. Next, in Decision 2, they fill
out a conditional contribution table (see Figure 2.2). In this table, they indicate how many tokens
they would like to contribute to the group project conditional on the other group members’ average
contribution in Decision 1. For example, they state how much they would like to contribute if the
other group members contributed 0 tokens on average in Decision 1, how much they would like to
contribute if others contributed 1 token on average in Decision 1, and so on. Thus, in Decision 2,
subjects make a total of 21 conditional contribution decisions.
After all subjects participate in the online experiment, we randomly construct groups of three.
Next, for each group, we randomly pick two group members for which Decision 1 will be im-
plemented. We implement Decision 2 for the other group member. In other words, we randomly
determine which two group members’ unconditional contribution decisions will be implemented.
Depending on the average unconditional contribution made by these two group members, we im-
plement the other group member’s conditional contribution as indicated in her conditional contri-
bution table. Then, we calculate the earnings accordingly. Payments for the online experiment are
delivered by Venmo, Paypal or cash. In order to avoid any potential contamination that may be
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created by the outcome of this stage, the subjects are not informed about the outcome and receive
their payments for the online experiment only after Stage 2 is conducted.
The FGF conditional contribution game described above is a good way to measure the gen-
erosity level (βi) of the subjects in the public good game. It is commonly used in the literature
(with over 2,000 citations) to classify subjects into types in the public good game: selfish (or free-
riders who contribute zero), conditional cooperator (subjects whose contributions depend on the
others’ average contribution) and pro-social (or full cooperators who contribute everything).17 As
described in Section 2.3, each subject’s type is determined by their level of generosity, βi. Those
with a relatively low βi are selfish, those with a high βi are pro-social and others with a βi some-
where in between are conditional cooperators. Since one of our goals is to create more and less
generous groups in the lab, we calculate a measure for each subject by using the data collected
from the conditional contribution game in Stage 1. More specifically, we calculate the following
parameter, that works as a proxy for the subject’s level of generosity (i.e. βi), for each subject:
β̂i =
∑20
j=0(g
i
j − j)∑20
j=0 j
where gij is subject i’s stated conditional contribution in Decision 2 for an average contribution
by others, j = 0, 1..., 20. If a subject is selfish, whose contribution is always zero independent of
others’ giving, then her β̂i is equal to −1. If a subject is pro-social, who always contributes all
of her endowment independent of others’ giving, her β̂i is equal to +1. If a subject is a perfect
conditional cooperator, whose giving perfectly matches others’ average contribution, then her β̂i
is equal to 0. In general, if a subject is more generous, she tends to contribute higher amounts for
any average contribution level of the other group members resulting in a larger β̂i.
Next, we rank all the subjects based on their β̂i and divide them into two equally populated
samples using the median. This gives us two samples, one below the median and one above the
median. The first sample includes selfish subjects as well as conditional cooperators, thus it is
17Boosey et al. (2018) shows the validity of this procedure to explain behavior in public goods games. Also see
Thöni and Volk (2018) that review 17 replication studies of FGF and show that FGF findings are stable.
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relatively more selfish. The second sample is relatively more generous since it includes pro-social
subjects who contributed everything as well as conditional cooperators. More information on the
distribution of types in our experiment is provided in Section 2.5. Next, we use these two samples
to control for the generosity level in the public good game in the lab as explained below.
Stage 2: After dividing the subjects into two equally populated samples, we invite them to
participate in the second stage in the Economic Research Lab at Texas A&M University.
Subjects play a one shot linear public good game in groups of three for ten rounds in the lab.
The groups in each round are constructed randomly (stranger matching design). In each round,
subjects start out with 20 tokens (1 token =$0.50) in their individual accounts and are asked to
decide how many of these 20 tokens, if any, they would like to contribute to a group project (gi).
The monetary payoff function for this game is as follows:
Mi = 20− gi + v
3∑
k=1
gk
The MPCR (v) of the public good is either 0.40 with 0.5 probability or 0.60 with 0.5 prob-
ability, which is determined randomly and independently for each group in each round.18 In the
Uninformed treatment, subjects make their contribution decision about the public good without
knowing which MPCR is selected for that round, but they know that it is either 0.40 or 0.60 with
equal probability. In the Informed treatment, subjects are informed about the randomly chosen
MPCR for that round and then are asked to make their contribution decisions about the public
good. In both treatments, at the end of each round subjects receive feedback about their earnings,
other group members’ average contribution, and the randomly determined MPCR in the round.
In the Selfish (Generous) treatment, we only invite subjects whose β̂i was below (above) the
median. This is how we control for the level of generosity in each session. At the end of the
instructions, before the experiment starts, we remind subjects about their participation in the online
experiment and provide them with information about the level of generosity in their session. More
18The independent draw of the MPCR on the round and the group level eliminates any potential effect coming from
the order of the MPCR.
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Figure 2.3: Providing Info About the Session’s Generosity Level
specifically, using a neutral language, we explain how we have created a measure (i.e. β̂i) using
their responses in the online experiment and ranked everyone based on their measure as shown in
Figure 2.3. In the Selfish (Generous) treatment, we tell subjects that participants from Population
1 (2) were invited for that session.
2.5 Results
Six experimental sessions were conducted in the Economic Research Lab at Texas A&M Uni-
versity in April 2017. Subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner et al., 2004), and the lab
experiment was coded in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Average earnings were $9.85 in the first
stage and $21 in the second stage (including a show up fee of $8 in the second stage).
A total of 360 subjects participated in the online experiment and 44 of these preferred not to be
invited to the lab experiment. From the remaining group, we excluded 13 as their behavior in the
online experiment seemed to be random. The final pool of subjects for Stage 2 was 303 and 111 of
those participated in the second stage.
2.5.1 Stage 1 Findings
The attrition rate from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is high since when recruiting for the online experi-
ment, it was impossible to predict whether a subject would be assigned to the Selfish or Generous
treatment sessions. This made it difficult to schedule session times that would be convenient for
a large number of subjects. Nevertheless, it is important to confirm that there is no systematic
difference in the generosity level of the subjects who participated in both stages versus the ones
who participated in the first stage only. For this purpose, we look at Figure 2.4 that presents the
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of β̂i
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percentage distribution of β̂i, as computed using (6), for the 303 participants who were invited to
Stage 2 in our experiment. The darker color represents the participants who participated in both
stages (111 subjects), whereas the lighter color- the participants who only participated in the first
stage (192 subjects). Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test, we confirm that
the difference between the distribution of β̂i across these two samples is not statistically significant
(p-value is 0.536).
The mean and median of β̂i from the online experiment are -0.25 and -0.11 respectively. The
median is the cut-off point for the Generous and Selfish sessions. The subjects whose β̂i is be-
low (above) the median are invited to the Selfish (Generous) treatment sessions. This is the only
difference between these two treatments.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the conditional contribution decisions made in Stage 1 by those who
also participated in Stage 2. A perfect conditional cooperator who always matches the others’
average contribution would be located on the 45 degree line. If a subject is located above this
45 degree line, it indicates that the subject contributed more than others for all possible average
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Figure 2.5: Average Contributions in Stage 1 for Each Possible Average Contribution of Others
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contributions made by other group members. On the contrary, a subject who contributed less than
the average would be located below this line. The average conditional contributions made for each
possible contribution level of others looks almost identical to FGF data. Figure 2.5 also illustrates
the average conditional contributions made by the subjects in Generous and Selfish treatments
separately.
2.5.2 Stage 2 Findings
First, we compare the average contributions made across treatments. We do this by taking the
average amount of tokens contributed across all ten periods by each subject and compare them us-
ing bootstrap t-test.19 Table 2.1 presents these average contributions made across treatments. First
of all, it is not surprising to see that average contributions in Generous treatment is always higher
than the Selfish treatment (p-value < 0.000 for all three conditions). Next, in the Selfish treatment
we find that Uniformed average contributions are not different than Informed contributions with
low MPCR (p-value is 0.333). However, Uninformed contributions are significantly different than
19Mann-Whitney U test also yield very similar p-values.
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Informed contributions with high MPCR (p-value is 0.015). Subjects in the Selfish treatment do
not respond to information when they receive bad news (MPCR of 0.40), but they significantly
increase their contributions when they receive good news (MPCR of 0.60). This is line with Hy-
pothesis 1. In the Generous treatment, we see the opposite as stated in Hypothesis 2. Average
Uninformed contributions are not statistically different from the Informed contributions with high
MPCR (p-value is 0.838), but they are different from the Informed contributions with low MPCR
(p-value is 0.039). Contrary to the Selfish treatment findings, subjects in the Generous treatment
do not respond to good news, but they significantly decrease their contributions upon obtaining
bad news.
Table 2.1: Average Contributions Across Treatments
Uninformed Informed
High MPCR Low MPCR
Selfish 3.56 (n=18) 6.67 (n=33) 4.37 (n=33)
Generous 12.41 (n=24) 12.14 (n=36) 9.24 (n=35)
This is also evident in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6 shows the average contributions in all ten periods
in both Selfish (left) and Generous (right) treatments. As you can see in Figure 2.6, in the Selfish
treatment, uninformed contributions follow a similar path as the informed contributions for the
low MPCR over time. However, there is a jump in the level of average informed contributions
for the high MPCR. On the other hand, in the Generous treatment, while the average uninformed
contributions follow a similar path as the informed average contributions for the high MPCR,
there is a decrease in average informed contributions for the low MPCR relative to the uninformed
contributions. Finally, as expected, average informed contributions are always higher for the high
MPCR for both Selfish and Generous treatments.
To check the robustness of our findings, we next present the regression results. Since the low-
est possible contribution amount is zero tokens and the highest possible contribution amount is
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Figure 2.6: Mean Contributions
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20 tokens, we need to control for potential censuring. Although Tobit model is useful in order to
account for censoring, it restricts the data by not allowing different motives behind the contribution
of zero.20 In other words, Tobit model does not differentiate between the subjects who are selfish
and would always contribute zero no matter what, and those who contribute zero due to treatment
(for example due to receiving bad news). Following (Moffatt, 2015, Ch 11.), we use a double hur-
dle model (also see Brown et al., 2017 for another example of using hurdle model in experimental
data).
The double hurdle model treats the probability of being a contributor and the extent of contri-
bution separately. Thus, by using this model, we can examine the impact of information on the
extensive and intensive margin. The results are reported in Table 2.2. We first run a Probit model
regression using the cross section of all 111 subjects to analyze the factors that impact whether
subjects contribute or not (i.e. being a potential contributor or not). The dependent variable in
this probit model is Contributed which takes the value of one if the subject contributed a positive
amount in any of the ten periods; and zero otherwise. The estimates of the first hurdle are pre-
sented in the first column of Table 2.2. There are a total of six subjects who contributed zero in
all ten periods. Being in Informed treatment does not affect the probability of contributing to the
20A similar reasoning can also apply to subjects who contribute everything. Since we have only one subject who
contributed everything in all periods, we restrict our attention to only selfish types.
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public good. This means that information does not impact contributions on the extensive margin.
However, being in the Selfish treatment significantly decreases the probability of contributing. This
is not surprising given that we created the Selfish vs. Generous treatments based on the subjects’
level of generosity measured in Stage 1.
Table 2.2: Double Hurdle Model Regression Results
Selfish Treatment Generous Treatment
Probit Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Selfish -0.836∗
(0.470)
Informed 0.00403 2.332∗∗ 0.865 -2.559∗ -4.675∗∗∗
(0.431) (1.144) (1.009) (1.379) (1.179)
Informed*High MPCR 3.211∗∗∗ 3.555∗∗∗
(0.773) (0.580)
Lagged Others’ Average 0.258∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0741) (0.0705) (0.0460) (0.0536)
Beta -0.976 -0.816 9.695∗∗∗ 9.709∗∗∗
(2.365) (2.082) (2.367) (2.126)
Period -0.253∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.0822 -0.0203
(0.111) (0.102) (0.118) (0.116)
Constant 2.126∗∗∗ 2.891∗ 3.150∗ 11.91∗∗∗ 11.51∗∗∗
(0.458) (1.704) (1.612) (1.692) (1.393)
Observations 111 414 414 531 531
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parentheses.
The dependent variable for the Probit model is Contributed which takes the value of 1 if the
subject contributed at least once, and otherwise zero. The dependent variable for the panel
data Tobit models is Contributions. The number of observations in column 1 is the total
number of subjects participated in this study. The numbers of observations in the remaining
four columns are the number of decisions made in 9 periods by subjects who contributed at
least once across all 10 periods.
Next, we run a Tobit model for Selfish and Generous treatments separately to study the factors
that impact contributions conditional on contributing at least once (i.e. conditional on being a
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potential contributor). Thus, we exclude the subjects who failed the first hurdle. In columns (2)-
(5), we report the marginal effects of the coefficients on the uncensored latent variable. The second
and the third columns are created using the data collected in the Selfish treatment and the last two
columns are created using the data collected in the Generous treatment. The dependent variable
for all four columns is the contributions to the public good in each round.
The first model in columns 2 and 4 shows the average impact of information on contribu-
tions. The variable Informed is a dummy variable for Informed treatment sessions. Thus, it takes
the value of 1 if the subjects were informed about the realized MPCR for that round before they
made their decisions. The model also controls for the following variables: Lagged Others’ Average
which is the average contributions made by other group members in the previous round, Beta which
is β̂i that was computed using the data from the online experiment (i.e. Stage 1), finally Period
which is simply the time trend. It is evident from these columns that, in Selfish treatment, informa-
tion has a positive and significant impact on contributions for those who are potential contributors.
On the other hand, in Generous treatment, information hurts the average contributions.
The second model in columns 3 and 5 studies the impact of information separately for good
and bad news. The variable Informed*High MPCR is the interaction term between Informed and
High MPCR. The baseline in columns 3 and 5 is the Uninformed treatment. Thus, the coefficient of
Informed shows the impact of receiving bad news. And, the coefficient of Informed*High MPCR
shows the impact of receiving good news relative to receiving bad news. Thus, the impact of
receiving good news relative to the Uninformed treatment is the summation of the coefficients of
Informed and Informed*High MPCR.
In the Selfish treatment, we see that when subjects are informed and if they find out that the
MPCR is low, then they do not significantly change their giving behavior relative to being un-
informed. In other words, they do not respond to bad news. However, when they are informed
and receive good news, then they respond to information by increasing their contributions. As
suggested by Hypothesis 1, the relative response to good news is larger than bad news, thus infor-
mation is good for contributions.
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On the other hand, in Generous treatment, when subjects are informed and if they receive
bad news, they significantly decrease their contributions relative to the contribution levels when
uninformed. When they receive good news, they respond to it by significantly increasing their
contributions relative to receiving bad news. Furthermore, as suggested by Hypothesis 2, the
negative response to bad news is stronger than the positive response to good news. Thus, on
average, information hurts contributions significantly on the intensive margin.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of information about the MPCR of a linear public
good on contributions. The theoretical model predicts that information provision has differential
impact on less and more generous groups. While information increases average contributions by
less generous subject groups, it reduces average contributions by more generous subject groups.
We experimentally test these hypotheses in the lab and the findings are in line with the theoretical
expectations. We find that information does not impact public good contribution on the extensive
margin. However, information impacts public good contributions on the intensive margin and the
sign of this impact depends on the generosity level of the sessions. In the relatively selfish sessions,
subjects who contributed at least once contribute more on average when they are informed com-
pared to when they are uninformed of the value of the public good. However, just the opposite is
true for the relatively generous sessions. In these sessions, subjects who are potential contributors
contribute less to the public good when they are informed. This is because their relative response
to bad news is greater than their response to good news.
The findings of this study have significant implications for fundraising. In particular, they sug-
gest that targeted information provision may be a more fruitful strategy of increasing public good
contributions than uniform information provision. Since donors themselves may be able to acquire
information by conducting research about non-profits prior to contributing, an important direction
for future research includes endogenizing the choice of information acquisition by donors. This
would allow us to glean further insight about the impact of information on public good provision
by studying how information acquisition incentives differ across donors.
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3. THE EFFECTS OF SCARCITY ON CHEATING AND IN-GROUP FAVORITISM
3.1 Introduction and Literature Review
Over 10% of the world’s population lives under extreme poverty.1 Even in developed coun-
tries, a significant proportion of the population suffers from scarcity of resources. For example,
in the United States, 41.2 million people (12.3% of the population) were food insecure in 2016,
meaning they did not have enough money or other resources to buy sufficient food to meet the
needs of all their household members (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2017). In addition to obvious detri-
mental effects, such as poor nutrition intake and health, an emerging literature proposes that living
under a prolonged state of scarcity impairs decision-making (Shah et al., 2012; Mani et al., 2013;
Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). Individuals living in poverty engage in
suboptimal behavior, such as excessive borrowing at high interest rates (Bertrand and Morse, 2011;
Dobbie and Skiba, 2013), playing lotteries (Haisley et al., 2008a,b), bad management of personal
finances and low saving rates (Barr, 2012). They are also less productive at work (Kim et al., 2006),
more impatient (Lawrance, 1991; Carvalho, 2010), more risk averse (Gloede et al., 2015) and have
lower self-control (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Spears, 2011; Bernheim et al., 2015).
There is a considerable amount of literature that connects poverty and crime, although causality
has not been robustly established (Ellis and McDonald, 2001; Sharkey et al., 2016). Notorious
criminals, from Al Capone to Pablo Escobar, use a lack of resources to justify initiating a lifetime
of illegal activities. For decades, the economic environment has been recognized as a critical factor
in criminal behavior (Sharkey et al., 2016). It should be noted, however, that recent literature
suggests a potential genetic predisposition to antisocial behavior and crime (Joseph, 2001; Raine,
2008; Mead et al., 2009; Raine, 2013; van Gelder and de Vries, 2014). The question of whether
criminal behavior is rooted in individual traits or influenced by scarcity is important to understand
in order to reduce criminal behavior.
1According to the World Bank, 766 million people live in extreme poverty with less than $1.90 per day.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity.
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In general, economic models that study criminal behavior suggest that an individual commits
a crime if the benefits outweigh the costs (i.e. potential punishments). In his seminal work, Gary
Becker (1968) argues that those who engage in criminal behavior do so not because their motiva-
tions differ from those of noncriminals but because their benefits and costs differ. Although crime
is more generally associated with violent felonies, the same economic rationale applies to other
types of lesser misconduct, such as cheating.
Cheating has recently received a considerable amount of interest from economists. Using in-
centivized games, researchers have shown that people cheat far less than standard economic theo-
retical predictions (e.g. Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Sutter, 2009;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Jiang, 2013).2 In these games, subjects have the opportunity
to increase their own monetary payoff by cheating. However, people do not cheat maximally and
exhibit an aversion to lying (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006;
Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Lundquist et al., 2009; Battigalli et al., 2013; Erat, 2013). Many fac-
tors impact dishonesty, including self-image (e.g. Mazar et al. 2008), anonymity of decisions
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2018), size of the stakes and incentives (Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017; Martinelli et al., 2018; Rahwan
et al., 2018), and fairness (Houser et al., 2012). Furthermore, research shows that cheating behav-
ior in the laboratory correlates with cheating behavior in the real world (Gächter and Schulz, 2016;
Potters and Stoop, 2016; Dai et al., 2018).
In this paper, we study the extent to which scarcity, in the form of a substantial reduction in
available resources, impacts cheating. We investigate this question by implementing a two-stage
lab-in-the-field experiment with poor coffee farmers from a small and relatively closed community
in Guatemala. Our participants derive their income almost exclusively from harvesting coffee
beans. As such, a sharp decline in their income during non-harvesting months provides a natural
variation in scarcity levels while other observables remain similar. We conducted our experiment
in two stages by using this distinctive variance in income. The first stage took place before the
2See Rosenbaum et al. (2014); Abeler et al. (2016); Capraro (2017); Jacobsen et al. (2018) for a more comprehen-
sive literature review.
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coffee harvest started (Scarcity period). We then repeated the same experiments, with the same
group of subjects, at the peak of the coffee harvest season (relative Abundance period).
We study differences in cheating behavior between the Scarcity and Abundance periods by us-
ing the die-roll game (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Similar to the die-under-cup paradigm
(Shalvi et al., 2011), we place a fair six-sided die in a cup with a closed lid. Subjects roll the six-
sided die by shaking the cup and are asked to report the outcome to determine their earnings. The
experiment is designed such that it is not possible to detect cheating behavior at the individual
level; thus, no retribution can be pursued, and the full cost of cheating is exogenously borne by
the experimenters. Thus, if individual characteristics are the main driving force behind cheating,
there should be no change in the cheating behavior across periods. However, if the economic envi-
ronment influences cheating behavior, then we expect higher levels of cheating during the Scarcity
period.
Although standard economic theory suggests otherwise, people may also cheat to help others.
A student taking an online exam or writing an essay in place of his/her friend, a person taking the
blame for a minor traffic accident because his/her friend does not have insurance, a teenager lying
to his/her friend’s parents to help with his/her cover up story could be examples of such behavior.
The motives behind this kind of dishonesty may be due to generosity or could be driven by past or
expected reciprocity. In this paper, we also study the impact of scarcity on cheating for others by
using the same die-roll game. We ensure that reciprocity cannot be a driving force by keeping the
identities of the beneficiaries anonymous.
According to the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), individuals place themselves
and others into groups, such as female, Caucasian, American, economists, poor, and so on. People
also show favoritism (i.e. bias or preferential treatment) toward others within their group. This
is called in-group favoritism (or in-group bias). In-group favoritism has been studied in the psy-
chology and economics literature mainly by using people’s natural identities (e.g. Klor and Shayo,
2010; Ockenfels and Werner, 2014; Cadsby et al., 2016) or by experimentally inducing identities
(i.e. minimal group paradigm) (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Buchan et al., 2006; Chen and Li,
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2009; Chen and Chen, 2011; Harris et al., 2015). In this paper, we use the subjects’ natural village
identities to study how scarcity impacts in-group favoritism in terms of cheating.
Economic research on pro-social dishonesty is fairly new (Lewis et al., 2012; Gino et al., 2013;
Okeke and Godlonton, 2014; Cadsby et al., 2016; Lupoli et al., 2017). Cadsby et al. (2016) ask
whether people cheat for an in-group member at the expense of an out-group member and report
significant cheating behavior. However, in-group favoritism in the absence of an externality to an
out-group member has not been studied. In our study, the cost of favoring an in-group member
is entirely borne by the experimenters. Furthermore, we compare in-group favoritism in cheating
across Scarcity and Abundance periods.
The geographical location and sample population of the experiment were carefully selected.
First, the residents of the village derive most of their yearly income from seasonal coffee harvest.
This ensures that participants experience a financially worse situation in Scarcity relative to the
Abundance period. Second, coffee is a perennial crop continuously harvested and sold weekly or
biweekly. As such, the coffee harvest provides steady income during the harvest season. Finally,
the village is relatively isolated. With limited transportation options, participants’ mobility for the
purposes of procuring outside income is impaired. All of these factors ensure that available re-
sources are indeed scarce during the Scarcity period relative to the Abundance period. Meanwhile,
other factors such as stress level, number of recent celebratory events attended, interactions with
others outside of the village, level of physical activity, and so on remain similar. We confirm this
by comparing survey measures across the two periods.
We contribute to the literature by studying how scarcity impacts dishonesty and in-group fa-
voritism in terms of cheating using a lab-in-the-field experiment; to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to study these questions.3 Our results show that subjects cheat the most for themselves
and that this cheating behavior is not impacted by scarcity. We find that subjects also cheat for the
in-group member (although less) and that this cheating is also not impacted by scarcity. Subjects
3While we were in the process of writing this paper, we became aware of a working paper, Boonmanunt et al.
(2018), that studies poverty, social norms, and cheating. Their experiments were conducted around the same time as
ours; however, they focus on the impact of social norms on cheating and how this changes due to poverty.
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do not cheat for the out-group member in the Abundance period. Thus, we find in-group favoritism
in terms of cheating in the Abundance period.
However, in-group favoritism disappears in the Scarcity period. Although scarcity does not
impact the cheating behavior for oneself and for the in-group member, it significantly increases
cheating for the out-group member. In the Scarcity period, subjects cheat for the out-group member
just as much as they do for the in-group member.
We also contribute to the literature by studying the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism in
terms of generosity. In our cheating game, the cost of favoring an in-group member is purely moral.
We also investigate the effects of scarcity on in-group favoritism when the cost of the preferential
treatment is monetary. We do this by using a dictator game where the recipient is either an in-group
member or an out-group member. In line with recent research (e.g. Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Whitt and
Wilson, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011; Balliet et al., 2014), we also find in-group
favoritism, but only in the Abundance period. While subjects send significantly more money to the
in-group member in the Abundance period, the difference vanishes during the Scarcity period. In
the Scarcity period, subjects are significantly more generous towards the out-group member which
abolishes the in-group favoritism.
Earlier papers studying the correlation between scarcity and other-regarding preferences have
mixed findings (e.g. Piff et al., 2010; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Andreoni et al., 2017). Bartos
(2016) exploits a shock in income similar to ours during an agricultural harvest season, and he finds
that the amount sent to an in-group member in a dictator game remained unchanged during scarcity
and abundance periods. This is in line with our findings. We contribute to the literature by studying
the causal impact of scarcity on other-regarding preferences as well as in-group favoritism.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.2.1 Selection of Participants and Recruitment Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a small and relatively isolated village in Guatemala. The
village is home to about 190 families whose main source of income is derived from harvesting
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coffee beans. Coffee is a perennial crop that is continuously harvested and sold during a period of
five to six months (depending on the amount of rain and general climate conditions). In this part
of Guatemala, harvesting normally occurs between late September and early March. A few studies
have used agricultural harvest to separate scarce and abundant periods (e.g. Bartos, 2016; Mani
et al., 2013; Boonmanunt et al., 2018). However, they use annual crops (such as sugar cane and
rice), which means there is a one-time harvest and a single lump sum payment. In our case, our
subjects sell their coffee beans to their local cooperative and receive steady weekly or bi-weekly
payments during the five to six months long harvest season.
The selection of coffee farmers in this isolated community is crucial for identification pur-
poses. During the non-harvesting months, participants live mainly on accumulated savings made
during the harvest season. During this time, they also work on subsistence crops planted for self-
consumption and the maintenance of the coffee plants such as pruning, weeding, and fertilizing.
This is mostly a self-sustaining community. The closest settlement is about 45 minutes away by
car. However, villagers have limited transportation options since most of them do not own motor
vehicles. Thus, their mobility for the purposes of procuring outside income is severely impaired.
About 95% of our subjects derive the majority of their income from harvesting coffee, and their in-
teraction with people outside of their village is fairly constant across harvesting and non-harvesting
months. All of these factors provide an ideal environment to study our research questions.
We employed five local assistants from the vicinity of the community to help recruit partici-
pants to our study. During the recruiting process, the assistants informed potential participants that
the study consisted of economic decision-making and that they would be compensated with 20Q
(Quetzales, about $3) for their participation. Prospective participants were also informed that they
would have the opportunity to earn more money based on their decisions, the decisions of others,
and luck. However, they were not provided with any details about the experimental procedures.
Although Spanish is the most commonly used language in Guatemala, people in the rural areas also
speak other languages such as K’iche’ and Kaqchiquel. Thus, we instructed our study assistants to
only recruit people who could understand and speak Spanish. The assistants were also instructed
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to recruit people who were at least numerate.
Our decision sheets, script, and experimental procedures were prepared so that people with low
education levels could understand all parts of the experiment. Our decision sheets included visual
illustrations and were prepared based on de Oliveira et al. (2012, 2016). We used large, poster-size
laminated copies of each page in the booklets. While one of the experimenters was reading the
instructions from a script, an assistant illustrated examples and instructions on the large laminated
copies using a dry erase-marker. This helped the participants become familiar with each page in
the booklet and ensured that all participants understood how the game worked and where they were
supposed to indicate their decisions. Other study assistants were trained regarding the experimental
procedures and were available to go around and privately help participants with any questions.
The experiment was conducted in two stages using a lab-in-the-field framework. The first stage
took place in mid-September 2017, before the coffee harvest season (Scarcity period). The second
stage took place in early December 2017, during the harvest season (Abundance period). In both
periods, subjects played a sequence of games in the same order.4 Because of the limitations that we
faced in the field, we did not control for the potential order effects. However, Abeler et al. (2016),
in their meta analysis, show that playing the cheating game repeatedly does not significantly change
the cheating behavior. Additionally, our main research interest is the comparison of scarcity and
abundance periods. Thus, we do not think that order is an issue for this paper. In this paper, we only
use the data collected from two games: cheating games and dictator games. Below, we provide the
experimental design and details of each game.
4This project is part of a larger study we conducted in the field. The same subjects played a sequence of games
without feedback in the same order across all sessions in both periods. The games and the exact order is as follows:
trust game with an in-group member (game 1), trust game with an out-group member (game 2), dictator game with
an in-group member (game 3), dictator game with an out-group member (game 4), Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008)
risk elicitation task (game 5), time preference elicitation task (game 6), and finally three Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) cheating game treatments (games 7–9)(see Section 3.2.2. for details), and a survey. At the end of the
experiment, one game out of the first six games was randomly chosen to be the paying game. The payment details for
cheating games 7–9 are provided in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 3.1: Cheating Game Payoffs
Number Reported Payoff
1 5Q
2 10Q
3 15Q
4 20Q
5 25Q
6 0Q
Note: Q refers to Guatemalan Quetzales.
5 Q is equivalent to 0.70 USD.
3.2.2 Cheating Game
We used the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) die-roll paradigm. In this game, subjects
are provided with an opaque cup with a closed lid, containing a fair six-sided die (similar to the
Shalvi et al. (2011) die-under-cup game). The cup is designed to ensure privacy. The only person
who can see the die (and the number rolled) inside the cup is the person holding it. This process
guarantees to participants that not even the experimenters would know the actual number rolled.
Subjects are instructed to shake the cup (thus roll the six-sided die) twice but to report only the
outcome of the first shake. The number reported determines the payment for completing a survey.
Table 3.1 reports the payment scheme used in this game.
We have a 3x2 within-subjects design: 1) Cheating for self (CheatingSelf), 2) Cheating for an
in-group member (CheatingInGroup), and 3) Cheating for an out-group member (CheatingOut-
Group) during 1) Abundance and 2) Scarcity periods. First, subjects played the cheating game for
themselves (CheatingSelf), which determined their earnings for completing the survey at the end of
the experiment. Then they played the same game for an anonymous person from the subject’s own
village (AP-InGroup), which is the CheatingInGroup treatment. Finally, they participated in the
CheatingOutGroup treatment and played the same game for an anonymous person from outside of
the village (AP-OutGroup). Thus, the only difference among these three treatments is the identity
of the beneficiary. The cheating games were played at the end of the experiment and were used
to determine the payments for completing the survey, similar to Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
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(2013).
We used our subjects’ naturally occurring village identity to study in-group favoritism. Prior
to the experimental sessions, with the help of one of our local contacts, we randomly chose one
person from the village to be the AP-InGroup. This person was discretely approached by one of
the experimenters and asked to make decisions, not relevant to this paper, and to answer the same
survey questions as the participants. The AP-InGroup was informed that it was very important for
his/her identity to remain strictly confidential. Hence, he/she was instructed to avoid mentioning
anything about our visit to anyone. We followed the same procedure with the AP-OutGroup.
The only information we provided to the subjects about the identity of the AP-InGroup (or
AP-OutGroup) was that they were someone from their own village (or another village). The real
identities of the AP-InGroup and AP-OutGroup remained unknown to the subjects. We opted to
use an anonymous person as the out-group member mainly for the ease of implementation, since
traveling across villages is cumbersome. Thus, it was not feasible to bring together subjects from
different villages. We used the same procedure for an in-group member (i.e. AP-InGroup) in
order to keep the procedure consistent across treatments and to prevent contamination from other
potential effects. For example, if subjects knew the identity of the in-group member, then their
behavior toward the in-group member might be biased in an unpredictable way based on their
personal interaction, experience, and beliefs about this person.
Every participant was paid for their earnings in the CheatingSelf treatment. At the end of the
experiment, one subject was randomly chosen, and his/her decision in the CheatingInGroup treat-
ment determined the earnings for AP-InGroup. Similarly, another person was randomly chosen to
determine the payment of the AP-OutGroup.
3.2.3 Dictator Game
In the Dictator Game, there are two players: a dictator and a recipient. The dictator is given
an endowment of 30Q (about $4.2) and asked to decide how much, if any, to send to the recipient.
The recipient does not have any endowment.
We employ a 2x2 within-subjects design: 1) In-group recipient (InGroup) and 2) Out-group
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recipient (OutGroup) during 1) Abundance and 2) Scarcity periods. Subjects were always the
dictators, and the only difference between the InGroup and OutGroup treatments is the identity
of the recipient. In the InGroup (OutGroup) treatment, the recipient is the AP-InGroup (AP-
OutGroup).
As previously mentioned (see footnote 5), subjects played a total of nine games (including two
dictator games and three cheating games) and were paid for their decisions in the dictator game
only if one of the two dictator games was randomly selected for payment. Thus, if the InGroup or
OutGroup treatments were randomly chosen to be the paying game, subjects’ earnings were calcu-
lated according to their decisions. Furthermore, we randomly chose one subject whose decisions
determined the earnings for the AP-InGroup or AP-OutGroup depending on the randomly chosen
game. The APs were paid for their total earnings after we finished all the sessions.
3.3 Results
A total of 109 low-income coffee farmers participated in our experiment.5 Nearly all partic-
ipants (95%) derive the majority of their income from harvesting coffee beans, with an average
yearly income of 8,399 Quetzales (about 1,120USD). About 41% of participants are female. Ad-
ditionally, 35% are 18–30 years old, 36% are 30–50 years, and the rest are older than 50. Finally,
28% have no formal education, while 63% hold either an elementary or a middle school diploma,
and 9% hold a high school diploma.
In the results presented below, unless stated otherwise, the reported p-values are derived by
either McNemar’s χ2 test (for binary variables) or Wilcoxon signed rank test (for non-binary vari-
ables).
5A total of 144 subjects participated in the first stage (Scarcity period). We exclude 3 subjects from the analysis
since they either did not understand Spanish or slept during the experiment. Of the remaining 141 subjects, 109 also
participated in the second stage (Abundance period). Table C.1 in the appendix compares observables between the
109 subjects who participated in both stages and the 32 subjects who participated in the first stage only. We do not
find a systematic difference between these two groups, which suggests that self-selection is not an issue.
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3.3.1 Comparison of Scarcity and Abundance Periods
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a survey. By comparing self-reported mea-
sures, we show that the main difference between the Scarcity and the Abundance periods is purely
financial; other observables are fairly constant across the two periods. See Table C.2 for the de-
scription of the survey measures, and Tables C.3 and C.4 for a more detailed comparison of these
measures across periods. The survey questions are provided in the online supplementary materials.
We asked participants to indicate whether they had experienced lack of money for various
needs in the preceding month. By using an index created with answers to these questions, we find
that a significantly higher proportion of subjects experienced lack of money in the Scarcity period
relative to the Abundance period (p-value = 0.004).6 While participants reported similar financial
conditions relative to others in the village (p-value = 1.000), they also indicated a worse state of
finances (p-value = 0.000) in the Scarcity period. This means that our participants experienced
harsher financial conditions in the Scarcity period. Additionally, they reported that everyone else
in the village was also experiencing similar financial situations. On the other hand, the proportion
of participants taking a credit/loan in the preceding six months is not significantly different (p-value
= 0.134). (It is important to note that farmers’ access to credit is limited.) Furthermore, there is no
difference in the frequency of celebratory events attended/organized (p-value = 0.414), and subjects
reported similar stress levels (p-value = 0.525) across the two periods. Finally, consistent with the
findings of Carvalho et al. (2016), participants’ risk preferences, measured by an incentivized
gamble (Eckel and Grossman, 2002, 2008), did not change across periods (p-value = 0.531).
In summary, these findings suggest that participants experienced more financial challenges and
hardship during the Scarcity period. However, other observables did not significantly differ across
the two periods.
6This index is created by summing the responses to four questions regarding lacking money in the preceding month
for the following situations: food, basic expenses (non-food), medical expenses, and farm.
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3.3.2 Cheating Game Findings
Table 3.2 provides detailed information about the data collected in the cheating game treat-
ments. Columns 4-9 report the frequency of each number reported across all treatments and pe-
riods.7 A visual comparison of these distributions can be found on Figure B.1. in the appendix.
First, we compare the distribution of reported numbers in each treatment to a uniform distribution
and report the p-values in the third column. Next, we compare the expected probability of each
number occurring (16.7%) to the reported frequencies by using a one-sided binomial test. The
resulting p-values are indicated with stars in each cell. Finally in the last column, we report the
average number reported in each treatment and period.8
Additionally, similar to Wang et al. (2017), we also examine cheating behavior as the high-
paying numbers (3, 4, and 5) being reported more often than the random occurrence of 50%.
In other words, if the subjects are honest and report the observed outcome, then on expectation,
the high payoffs should occur half of the time. Thus, reporting high payoffs more often than
50% represents the prevalence of cheating in order to increase earnings. Figure 3.1 shows the
frequencies of high payoffs reported across all treatments and periods.
Result 1: In the Abundance period, subjects cheat for themselves and for the in-group member
but not for the out-group member.
First, we compare the distribution of reported numbers in each treatment to a uniform distri-
bution (see p-values in the third column of Table 3.2). Only the CheatingOutGroup treatment in
the Abundance period is not significantly different from a uniform distribution. This means that
the only treatment in which subjects did not cheat was the CheatingOutGroup treatment during the
Abundance period.9
7We conducted a simulation analysis to assess the randomness of the sample with 109 subjects. We found that our
sample size provides a statistically valid random uniform distribution (p-value = 0.046). The details of the simulation
procedure are available in Appendix D.
8The expected number reported is 2.5 since six is coded as zero.
9Although our research questions (thus the experimental design) are different, Cadsby et al. (2016) also found that
people cheat not only for themselves but also cheat for an in-group member. However, it is important to note that
Cadsby et al. (2016) conducted their study in a lab and did not investigate the role of scarcity. While their environment
could be more analogous to our Abundance period, we need to be cautious about a one-to-one comparison of our
findings to theirs (or those of other similar papers).
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Table 3.2: Proportion of Subjects who Reported the Corresponding Numbers
Number Reported† Average
p-values 0 1 2 3 4 5 Number
A
bu
nd
an
ce Self 0.000 2.75*** 2.75*** 5.50*** 8.26*** 27.52*** 53.21*** 4.15
InGroup 0.000 6.42*** 7.34*** 12.84 19.27 22.94* 31.19*** 3.39
OutGroup 0.276 11.01* 21.10 14.68 12.84 19.27 21.10 2.72
Sc
ar
ci
ty Self 0.000 1.85*** 2.78** 9.26** 12.96 19.44 53.70*** 4.07
InGroup 0.000 6.48*** 6.48*** 12.04* 26.85*** 25 ** 23.15* 3.27
OutGroup 0.002 9.26** 12.04* 10.19** 20.37 28.70*** 19.44 3.06
† Since reporting a 6 paid nothing, it is coded as 0. * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, and *** < 0.01.
The p-values reported on the third column are obtained by Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test run against
a uniform distribution. The p-values indicated with stars in columns 4-9 are obtained from one-sided
binomial probability tests for the proportion being larger (smaller) than 16.67%. See Figure B.1 in the
appendix for a visual comparison of the distributions of each number reported across treatments and
periods.
We also find supporting evidence for Result 1 when we compare the high payoffs reported
across treatments. Figure 3.1 shows that, in the Abundance period, high payoffs are reported signif-
icantly more often than random chance would predict in both CheatingSelf (89%) and CheatingIn-
Group (73%) treatments (one-sided binomial probability test p-value is 0.000 for both). Moreover,
the high payoffs are not reported significantly more than half of the time in CheatingOutGroup
(53%) treatment (p-value = 0.2829).
Result 2: In the Abundance period, subjects exhibit in-group favoritism.
Comparing the average number reported across treatments (reported on the last column in
Table 3.2), we find evidence of in-group favoritism in the Abundance period. The average number
reported for the in-group member (3.39) is significantly higher than the one reported for the out-
group member (2.72) (p-value = 0.0002).
This in-group favoritism is also evident in Figure 3.1. Subjects favor the in-group member in
the Abundance period by reporting high payoffs significantly more often for the in-group member
(73%) than for the out-group member (53%) (p-value = 0.0005). Subjects behave more favorably
toward an anonymous person from their own village relative to an anonymous person from another
village. This finding in the Abundance period is in line with the social identity theory (Tajfel and
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of Subjects who Reported High Payoffs Across Treatments
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Turner, 1979).
Result 3: Scarcity does not impact cheating for oneself or for the in-group member.
The average numbers reported for oneself and the in-group member are 4.15 and 3.39 in the
Abundance period, and 4.07 and 3.27 in the Scarcity period respectively. The differences between
the Scarcity and the Abundance periods are not significant for neither CheatingSelf (p-value =
0.5492) nor CheatingInGroup (p-value = 0.4641) treatments.
This can also be seen in Figure 3.1. Participants’ cheating behavior for themselves is not
statistically different across the two periods (89% vs. 85%) (p-value = 0.4142).10 Additionally, we
also find that cheating behavior for the in-group member is not different across the two periods
(73% vs. 74%) (p-value = 0.8618). Although subjects cheat less for the in-group member than
for themselves, this behavior is not different across periods, implying that scarcity does not affect
participants’ cheating behavior for themselves or for the in-group member.
Result 4: In-group favoritism fades in the Scarcity period.
In the Scarcity Period, the average numbers reported for the in-group member and the out-group
member are 3.27 and 3.06 respectively and the difference is not statistically significant (p-value =
10This finding is line with Boonmanunt et al. (2018). In their experiment, when subjects were not reminded of social
norms, their cheating behavior was not impacted by poverty.
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0.3899).
Figure 3.1 shows that, in the Scarcity period, participants cheat for the out-group member
(68%) (i.e. the frequency of high-paying numbers being reported is significantly different than
50%, p-value = 0.000) as much as they do for the in-group member (74%) (the difference is not
significant, p-value = 0.2623). Scarcity sweeps away in-group favoritism. In-group favoritism
disappears not because cheating for the in-group member decreases but because subjects cheat
for the out-group member at the same rate as they do for the in-group member. In other words,
subjects cheat significantly more for the out-group member in the Scarcity (68%) compared to
the Abundance period (53%) (p-value = 0.0061). These findings suggest that scarcity produces
a general empathy toward out-group members. We further explore this issue in a dictator game
context in the following section.
Subjects cheat for themselves as well as for the in-group member, and this is not impacted
by scarcity. However, even in an experiment like ours, where there is no risk of being caught
and punished, participants do not cheat for others as much as they do for themselves. There are
two potential explanations. First, people may be envious and prefer others to earn less than they
do, which could also result in anti-social cheating. However, we do not see evidence for such
behavior. Second, there may be non-monetary costs associated with cheating behavior, which is in
line with lying aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Mazar
and Ariely, 2006; Lundquist et al., 2009; Battigalli et al., 2013; Erat, 2013). The costs of favoring
the in-group member in the cheating game treatments are non-monetary. In the next section, we
also study the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism when the cost of this preferential treatment
is monetary.
3.3.3 Dictator Game Findings
In this section, we study the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism using the dictator game
described in Section 3.2.3.
Result 5: In the Abundance period, subjects are more generous toward the in-group member
relative to the out-group member.
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Figure 3.2: Average Dictator Giving Across Treatments
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the average amount sent in the dictator game in each treatment across the
Abundance and Scarcity periods. The amount sent to the in-group member (10.13Q) is signifi-
cantly higher than the amount sent to the out-group member (6.85Q) during the Abundance period
(p-value = 0.000). This is in line with the findings in the literature (e.g. Whitt and Wilson, 2007;
Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2011; Balliet et al., 2014). While the
environment in these papers is more analogous to our Abundance period, we need to be cautious
about a one-to-one comparison of our findings to others that did not study for scarcity.
Result 6: In-group favoritism fades in the Scarcity period. This change is driven by a significant
increase in giving toward the out-group member.
There is no significant in-group bias in pro-social behavior during the Scarcity period. While
subjects send about 10.52Q to the in-group member, they send 9.36Q to the out-group member, and
the difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1219). Scarcity eliminates the in-group
bias in pro-social behavior.
Again, and similar to the results of the cheating game, in-group bias disappears due to an
increase in giving to the out-group member rather than a decrease in giving to the in-group member.
The amount sent to the out-group member during the Scarcity period (9.36Q) is statistically higher
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression of the Amount Sent in the Dictator Game
Variable Abundance Scarcity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Out-group Member -3.275∗∗∗ -3.433∗∗∗ -1.165 -1.217
(0.959) (1.016) (0.880) (0.932)
Female 0.518 -2.541∗∗∗
(1.066) (0.969)
Number of People in Household -0.444∗∗ 0.371∗
(0.217) (0.198)
Coffee Main Source of Income -0.475 -2.630
(2.164) (1.968)
Risk -0.0458 0.370
(0.270) (0.289)
Celebrations 2.112∗ -1.788
(1.195) (1.190)
Stress -0.730 -1.978∗
(0.914) (1.071)
Constant 13.40∗∗∗ 16.36∗∗∗ 11.69∗∗∗ 17.14∗∗∗
(1.516) (3.758) (1.391) (3.854)
No. Observations 218 194 218 184
No. people 109 97 109 92
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the amount sent in the dictator game.
than the amount sent during the Abundance period (6.85Q) (p-value: 0.0069). Meanwhile, there
is no difference in the amount sent to the in-group member between the Abundance and Scarcity
periods (p-value = 0.5594). The latter finding is in line with Bartos (2016), who also looked at the
impact of scarcity on giving behavior in the dictator game and found that scarcity does not impact
giving. In his study, the recipient was someone from the same village as the participants. Thus, his
findings can be compared to our InGroup treatment findings.
Table 3.3 presents the OLS regression results of the amount sent in the dictator game. We run
the regressions separately for each period. The first two columns report Abundance period results
while the last two report Scarcity period results. The dependent variable in all columns is the
amount sent in the dictator game. The reference group is the InGroup treatment. Looking at the
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first column, we see that subjects sent about 3.3Q less to the out-group member compared to the
in-group member in the Abundance period. This finding holds even after we control for some ob-
servables. This result indicates that subjects show a clear in-group favoritism in the dictator game
by sending significantly less to the out-group member. Furthermore, this in-group favoritism goes
away in the Scarcity period. The coefficient for the OutGroup treatment is no longer significant.
Thus, in the Scarcity period, we do not find a significant in-group favoritism in dictator giving.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Previous literature documents that people living under precarious conditions of scarcity tend
to make suboptimal economic and financial decisions. Motivated by this emerging literature, we
study the impact of scarcity on moral and pro-social behavior. More specifically, we study whether
an individual’s propensity to cheat originates mostly in individual characteristics or in the sur-
rounding economic environment (i.e. scarcity). In addition, we also study the impact of scarcity
on in-group favoritism in cheating and pro-social behavior.
People engage in dishonest behavior in various forms. In this paper, we focus on two types of
cheating behavior. The first type results in a personal gain. While the plausible moral cost is borne
by the individuals, the monetary cost is entirely assumed by the experimenters. Although this type
of cheating does not create a negative externality on another subject, technically it cannot be con-
sidered a Pareto improvement since the increase in earnings is compensated by the experimenters
from their research budgets. This is relevant in many economic settings. For example, people often
misreport their income in order to pay lower taxes (Kettle et al., 2017), business executives misuse
corporate accounts and make unnecessary charges (Litzky et al., 2006). In most of these cases, the
monetary cost of cheating may not be salient to the individuals since the dishonesty hurts a large
corporation or institution rather than another individual (Smigel, 1956).
The second type of cheating studied in this paper is pro-social cheating. Subjects have the
opportunity to cheat to increase the payoff of another person, either an in-group or an out-group
member, with neither monetary costs nor benefits to the decision maker. In this case, the cheating
decision is made by comparing the utility coming from the pro-social act of increasing someone’s
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earnings and the disutility coming from the moral cost of cheating.
Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, we study these two types of cheating behavior across pe-
riods of Scarcity and Abundance. A significant increase in our subjects’ income during the Abun-
dance period allows us to study the role of scarcity on cheating and pro-social behavior. In order to
control for other potential factors changing across Scarcity and Abundance periods, we carefully
selected a rural community located in Guatemala that experiences similar conditions across the
two periods in terms of stress, risk, and physical activity levels.
We find that scarcity does not affect participants’ cheating behavior for themselves. Contrary
to Aristotle’s quote at the beginning of the paper, our findings suggest that cheating in an effort to
increase the participant’s own well-being is not impacted by the economic environment. However,
we also find that people cheat for others even though they do not directly benefit from it. While
people cheat more for the in-group member relative to the out-group member during the Abun-
dance period, this in-group favoritism in cheating vanishes during the Scarcity period. In fact,
subjects do not cheat at all for the out-group member during the Abundance period, but they cheat
for the out-group member during scarcity.
We also use a dictator game to study in-group favoritism in pro-social behavior. This allows us
to study the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism when the cost of this preferential treatment is
monetary rather than moral. We find a similar pattern of behavior. While subjects send significantly
more to the in-group member during the Abundance period, this gap is no longer statistically
significant in the Scarcity period. Furthermore, the in-group favoritism in pro-social behavior is
swept away by an increase in giving to the out-group member rather than a reduction in giving to
the in-group member. Looking at the findings from both experimental games, we conclude that
scarcity eliminates in-group bias in terms of pro-social and moral behavior.
One limitation of our study is that we do not study the mechanism behind these results. One
potential explanation for our findings could be that scarcity may change and shift people’s social
identities. Future research can study how scarcity may impact social identity.
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4. DO WORKERS EXERT MORE EFFORT FOR MISSION-ORIENTED JOBS?
4.1 Introduction and Literature Review
There is a large literature that studies worker motivation and the factors that encourage workers
to exert higher levels of effort in the workplace. In general, this literature shows that there is a
reciprocal relationship between the employee and employer, and employees provide more effort
for higher wage levels. But workers may also exert more effort if their work has a mission. In
this paper, we are interested in understanding the nature of the relationship between the employee
and employer in two types of firms: for-profit and non-profit. More specifically, we ask whether
workers exert more effort, for a given a wage level, when they work for a non-profit firm rather
than a for-profit firm. We also ask whether managers who determine the wages offer different wage
levels across these two types of firms. We study these questions by using a modified gift exchange
environment where the decisions made by the worker and manager generate a payment to a third
party who is either another subject in the lab (which represents working for a for-profit firm) or a
non-profit organization.1
Our paper is closely related to the literature that studies the role that pro-social preferences play
on worker motivation. For example, Banuri and Keefer (2016) find that workers with higher pro-
social motives exert more effort in pro-socially motivated tasks. Similarly, Carpenter and Myers
(2010) find that the decision to volunteer as a firefighter is correlated with altruism.2 Tonin and
Vlassopoulos (2010) reports that warm glow altruism and pure altruism have been the two sources
of workers’ pro-social motivation considered in the literature. They disentangle these two sources
by using a controlled field experiment and find that men do not exhibit either of these pro-social
motivations. On the other hand, women exert more effort due to warm glow altruism, but there is
no additional impact coming from pure altruism.
1For a survey of lab labor experiments including gift-exchange game which is utilized in this paper, please see
Charness and Kuhn (2011).
2A recent paper by Brown et al. (2018) investigate why people donate their time although the opportunity cost of
their time is probably higher than the benefit created to the charity. They explain this by showing how people may
have differential warm glow preferences depending on the form of the donation.
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There are also some studies that compare worker’s behavior across for-profit and non-profit
sectors. Gregg et al. (2011) examine whether workers in non-profit firms behave more pro-socially
than workers in for-profit firms by comparing the amount of unpaid overtime labor provided across
these types of firms. They find that workers in the non-profit sector are more likely to do unpaid
overtime. Cowley and Smith (2014), using data from world values survey, show that intrinsically
motivated workers are more likely to work in the public sector. However, they report some variation
across countries and argue that this variation could be partially explained by public corruption at
those countries.
This raises the question of causality of whether more pro-social individuals select into the
non-profit sector or whether they become more pro-social as a result of working in this sector. By
comparing individuals’ pro-social behavior after they change their sector, Gregg et al. (2011) shows
that more pro-social individuals self-select into non-profit and public sectors. Banuri and Keefer
(2016) also find that a real world pro-social organization attracts workers who are more pro-social.
Additionally, Dur and Zoutenbier (2014, 2015) show that altruism plays a role into sorting into
public sector. In a related strand of literature, researchers have studied how employers’ decision
to make a donation (i.e. corporate social responsibility (CSR)) impacts workers’ motivation (e.g.
Koppel and Regner, 2014, 2015; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015; Charness et al., 2016; Kajackaite
and Sliwka, 2017; Cassar, 2018).3
Literature also shows that although most workers care about the positive externality that their
firms create, they may also care about working for the right mission (i.e. mission alignment).
For example, Besley and Ghatak (2005) developed a theory regarding mission alignment and its
impacts on worker motivation. They predict that workers self select into missions, and this mission-
match enhances their efficiency at work. They show that if the workers are matched with the right
mission, they work hard even when the financial incentives are little. However, high-powered
incentives are needed to get workers to exert effort in the case of a mission mis-match. There
have been some studies testing the implications of this model and the findings are generally in line
3See Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) for a comprehensive literature review on CSR.
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with the predictions (e.g. Serra et al., 2011; Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014; Carpenter and Gong, 2016;
Smith, 2016; Banuri et al., 2018).
In more closely related literature, Fehrler and Kosfeld (2014) study whether workers exert more
effort if they choose the mission of their job. Using an experimental design that is very similar to
ours, they do not find any impact. The biggest difference between their design and ours is that
the random matching rule between the rounds. While they use a partners-matching design, ours
is a stranger-matching design. We suggest that this difference in the matching rule is the driving
force behind the differences between our findings. However, this claim should be approached with
caution since further investigation is needed. In a second experiment, they introduce endogeneity
where all subjects are assigned as workers and they decide whether they want to work for a profit
(generate donations to another student) or a non-profit (generate donations to an NGO) firm.4 They
find that subjects who choose to work for a non-profit firm exert more effort. As a result, they state
that self-selection into the non-profit sector is an important factor that could explain the empirical
findings in this sector.
In another related paper, Gerhards (2015) finds that mission-match increases workers’ efforts.
In their experiments, subjects are either matched with a mission of their preference (mission match
treatment) or a randomly and exogenously chosen mission (low mission match). Subjects exert
more effort in the mission match treatment. They have another experiment which is similar to our
paper. In this second experiment, subjects participate in the mission match and low mission match
treatments (within-subjects design) and play multiple rounds with the perfect stranger matching
rule. When the game is played repeatedly like this, they do not find any difference between the
two treatments. On the contrary, in another closely related study, Cassar (2018) does not find any
difference in the effort when the mission is matched compared to random mission assignment. She
suggests that increasing the quality of the mission-match does not generate any further gains.
In this paper, we study whether workers exert more effort when they are randomly assigned
to an exogenously chosen mission-oriented job. In our study, we randomly assign workers into
4Modifying the gift-exchange game like this takes away the reciprocity between the worker and the employer. It
would be interesting to test the robustness of these findings by using a design similar to their first experiment.
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either a non-profit firm or a for-profit firm. Thus, in our environment, self-selection into a mission
is not possible. In line with the prior literature, workers exert more effort for high wages in both
treatments. Similar to Cassar (2018), we also find that pro-social mission results in higher effort,
but only if the wage paid is high. In contrast to Cassar (2018), we find that managers offer the
same wages across the two treatments and thus their behavior is not impacted by the mission of the
firm. This results in higher profits generated in the non-profit treatment.
4.2 Experimental Design
We use a modified version of the Charness et al. (2004) gift exchange experiment. In this
modified version, there are three roles a subject can take to which they are randomly assigned:
a worker, a manager, and a firm owner. Subjects are put in groups of three that consist of one
worker, one manager, and one firm owner. First, the manager determines a wage level to be paid
to the worker. Then, the worker observes the wage and decides how much effort to provide. Both
the wage paid and the effort level provided determines the earnings for all three group members.
The payoff functions are as follows:
πW = wage− c(e) (4.1)
πM = 0.40 × Profit (4.2)
πF = 0.60 × Profit (4.3)
Profit = 2× e× (100− w) (4.4)
where W, M, and F represent worker, manager and firm owner respectively; and c(e) denotes
the cost of providing the effort level, e. Worker receives the wage (wage ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60})
determined by the manager and bears the cost of their chosen effort level. We use the Charness
et al. (2004) cost of effort schedule which is shown in Table 4.1.
While the wage increases the worker’s payoff, it decreases the profit. Both wage and effort
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Table 4.1: Worker’s Cost of Effort Schedule
e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
determine the profit which in turn determines the earnings for the manager and the firm owner.
The profit is calculated according to eq. (4.4) and is shared between the manager and the firm
owner. The firm owner receives 60% of the profit and the manager receives the remaining 40%. In
this game, the firm owner does not make any decisions. She simply collects her share of the profit.
First, the roles are assigned randomly at the beginning of the experiment and kept the same
for the duration of the experiment. Next, subjects are placed in groups of three that consist of one
worker, one manager and one firm owner. Subjects play this game for 20 rounds and are paid at
the end for two randomly selected rounds. Although the roles are fixed, groups are re-matched
randomly in each round. At the end of each round, we provide feedback about the wage chosen,
effort provided, and the earnings.
We have two treatments: Profit Treatment and Non-Profit Treatment. The only difference
between the two treatments is the identity of the firm owner. In the profit treatment, the firm owner
is another subject in the lab. Whereas in the non-profit treatment, the firm owner is a non-profit
organization. We chose Operation Kindness, which is the largest and oldest no-kill animal shelter
in North Texas, as the non-profit organization for this experiment. At the end of the experiment,
we randomly pick one of the subjects to be the monitor. The monitor is paid an extra $5 to stay a
little longer to make sure that earnings generated for Operation Kindness are donated to Operation
Kindness on the organization’s website.
4.3 Results
We ran a total of eleven sessions in the Economic Research Lab at Texas A&M University
in February and March 2018 with a total of 251 subjects. 141 subjects participated in the profit
treatment and the remaining 110 participated in the non-profit treatment. Thus, we have 47 workers
and managers in the profit treatment; and 55 workers and managers in the non-profit treatment.
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Table 4.2: Average Effort
Treatment Wage Paid
10 20 30 40 50 60
Profit 0.17(0.18)
n=41
0.21
(0.13)
n=38
0.31
(0.18)
n=47
0.41
(0.19)
n=47
0.51
(0.23)
n=43
0.59
(0.33)
n=42
Non-Profit 0.15(0.10)
n=46
0.21
(0.11)
n=45
0.34
(0.18)
n=53
0.49
(0.16)
n=55
0.64
(0.21)
n=55
0.72
(0.28)
n=47
p-values † 0.422 0.968 0.364 0.030 0.014 0.042
p-values ‡ 0.882 0.694 0.286 0.031 0.006 0.054
Standard deviations are in parentheses. †Bootstrapped t-test ‡Mann-Whitney test
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and the undergraduate students at
Texas A&M University were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner et al., 2004). Subjects earned $19
on average including a $10 show-up fee.
Similar to previous studies using the gift-exchange game (or variants of it), we do not find
support for Nash equilibrium (NE) predictions either. Although the managers are predicted to offer
the lowest possible wage of 10, the average wage offered across both treatments is 38.65 tokens.
Similarly, the workers provide significantly higher efforts (the average across both treatments is
0.44) than the NE of 0.1. In what follows, we first present findings on workers’ behavior, then
we present the findings on managers’ behavior and finally present and discuss the impact of these
observed behavior on firm profits.
4.3.1 Workers
As mentioned above, workers provide significantly higher efforts on average than the NE of
0.1. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 (a) show the average effort provided across treatments and for each
wage offered. In both treatments, there is a positive relationship between the wage offered and
the effort provided. This reciprocal relationship that we observe is similar to the findings in the
literature. When we compare the effort levels across treatments, we notice that the treatment does
not have an impact on effort for wages lower than 40. However, workers provide significantly
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Figure 4.1: Average Effort Provided
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higher levels of effort if the wage offered is 40 or higher.
The distribution of effort levels provided across treatments can be found in Figure B.3 for low
wages and Figure B.4 for high wages in the appendix. Using the Epps-Singleton test5, we compare
these distributions across profit and non-profit treatments. We find that the distributions are not
statistically significantly different if the wage offered is 10 (p-value: 0.105) or 20 (p-value: 0.311).
On the other hand, the distributions of efforts are significantly different across profit and non-profit
treatments if the managers offer 30 (p-value: 0.000), 40 (p-value: 0.000), 50 (p-value: 0.001), or
60 (p-value: 0.002).
Next, we look at the average effort provided over time. Looking at Figure 4.1 (b), we see
that the behavior seems fairly consistent with slight decline over time. Although there are some
fluctuations, the average effort provided in the non-profit treatment is mostly above the average
effort in the profit treatment.
To check the robustness of our findings, we also present the regression results. In our experi-
ment, workers cannot provide an effort lower than 0.1 or higher than 1. Thus, by using a panel data
Tobit model, we take this censuring into account. Table 4.3 presents the results. In both Panel A
and B, the dependent variable is Worker Effort which is the level of effort provided by the worker.
5Findings are similar if we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
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Table 4.3: Panel Data Tobit Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
DV: Worker Effort
Wage 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.000771) (0.000859) (0.000798)
Non-Profit 0.106∗∗ 0.0987∗∗ 0.473∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0432) (0.187)
Period -0.00776∗∗∗ -0.00777∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00152)
Female -0.0848∗ -0.0665
(0.0479) (0.0563)
Society Oriented 0.110∗∗∗
(0.0393)
Society Oriented*Non-Profit -0.0987∗∗
(0.0474)
Constant -0.247∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.550∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0643) (0.156)
Observations 2040 2040 2040
Panel B
DV: Worker Effort
High Wage (40-60) 0.376∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0333) (0.0304)
Non-Profit 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0622∗ 0.0580 0.444∗∗
(0.0405) (0.0366) (0.0508) (0.173)
High Wage*Non-Profit 0.0733∗∗ 0.0701 0.0695∗
(0.0340) (0.0434) (0.0365)
Period -0.00794∗∗∗ -0.00795∗∗∗
(0.00118) (0.00132)
Female -0.0775∗ -0.0587
(0.0404) (0.0495)
Society Oriented 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0333)
Society Oriented*Non-Profit -0.102∗∗
(0.0450)
Constant 0.0858∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ -0.198
(0.0410) (0.0368) (0.0464) (0.141)
Observations 2040 2040 2040 2040
Robust errors standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Wage is the wage offered by the manager to the worker in that period. Non-Profit is the dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 for the non-profit treatment, otherwise 0. Period is the trend
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variable, Female is the dummy variable for females. Society Oriented is constructed by using the
answers to the following item from the PSM (Public Service Measure) (Perry, 1996): "Making a
difference in society means more to me than personal achievements".6 It is between 1 (Strongly
Disagree) and 5 (Strongly Agree).
First, looking at Panel A, we see that workers are responsive to the wages offered. Workers
provide significantly higher effort for higher wage levels. Additionally, we see that workers pro-
vide significantly higher effort when they are in the non-profit treatment compared to the profit
treatment. Interestingly, we also find that caring about making a difference in society (i.e. being
society oriented) does not impact behavior in the non-profit treatment (the summation of the co-
efficients of Society Oriented and Society Oriented*Non-Profit is not significantly different from
zero). On the other hand, society-oriented individuals provide significantly higher levels of effort
when they are in the profit treatment.
We are also interested in the workers’ responsiveness to the wages in the non-profit treatment
compared to the profit treatment. We do not find a significant difference across the two treatments
(see Table C.5 in appendix).7
In Panel B of Table 4.3, we use a different measure for the wages. Instead using the actual
wage offered, we construct a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the wage offered was
high (i.e. 40, 50, or 60), and otherwise zero. We find that subjects are more responsive to high
wages in the non-profit treatment compared to the profit treatment.
4.3.2 Managers and Profits
In this section, we first study the managers’ behavior and then compare the profits created
across two treatments. Figure 4.2 (a) shows the average wage paid across treatments. Managers
paid workers 38 and 39 tokens, on average, in the profit and non-profit treatments respectively, and
they are not statistically different from one another (Mann-Whitney test p-value: 0.207). Figure
6This item is listed as PSM1 under the self-sacrifice subscale in Perry (1996).
7However, when we only include the first 15 periods, we find that workers in the non-profit treatment are sig-
nificantly more responsive to the wages compared to the profit treatment. Regressions using the first 15 periods are
presented on Table C.6.
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Figure 4.2: Average Wage Offered
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4.2 (b) shows the average wage offered over time across treatments. Average wages seem fairly
consistent over time and across treatments.
To check the robustness of these findings, we also ran a panel data tobit model regression
where the dependent variable is the wage paid in each period. Average marginal effects derived
from these regressions are presented in Table 4.4. According to these results, wages paid across
Table 4.4: Panel Data Tobit Regression Results for Wage
(1) (2)
DV: Wage Wage
Non-Profit 0.747 -0.447
(2.411) (2.625)
Female -1.639
(2.599)
Period 0.135∗
(0.0692)
Lagged Effort 13.82∗∗∗
(1.777)
Constant 38.68∗∗∗ 32.70∗∗∗
(1.815) (2.583)
Observations 2040 2040
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 4.3: Average Profits Generated Across Treatments
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treatments are not statistically different. Although we see that managers respond positively to the
effort provided in the previous round, we do not find any evidence that managers respond to the
treatment.
Next, we compare the profits generated in the profit and non-profit treatments. Figure 4.3 (a)
shows the average profits generated across treatments. Average profits are 44.85 and 53.67 tokens
in the profit and non-profit treatments respectively. Looking at the first column of Table 4.5, we
see that profits are significantly higher in the non-profit treatment. We can also compare the profits
generated across different wage levels. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3 (b), and regression analysis
results are provided in the second column of Table 4.5. We find that wages of 40 and 50 result in
the highest profits generated in both treatments.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether workers exert more effort when they work for a non-profit
vs. a for-profit firm when they are randomly assigned to these firms. We find that workers exert
higher levels of effort in the non-profit treatment only when the wages are high. For low wages,
we do not find a significant difference in effort levels between the two treatments. Interestingly,
managers do not respond to the treatment so the average wages paid across the two treatments are
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Table 4.5: Panel Data Tobit Regression Results for Firm Profits
(1) (2)
DV: Profits
Non-Profit 9.255∗∗ 0.291
(4.035) (5.448)
Period -0.592∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗
(0.128) 0.104
Wage 20 6.422
( 3.908 )
Wage 30 13.513∗∗∗
(4.013 )
Wage 40 20.689∗∗∗
( 5.098 )
Wage 50 21.891∗∗∗
( 5.880)
Wage 60 16.269∗∗
(6.492)
Wage 20*Non-Profit -1.273
(5.020)
Wage 30*Non-Profit 5.214
(5.124)
Wage 40*Non-Profit 10.372∗
(6.078)
Wage 50*Non-Profit 12.653∗
(7.387)
Wage 60*Non-Profit 10.220
(8.161)
Constant 50.1060∗∗∗ 34.961∗∗∗
(3.080) (4.185)
Observations 2,040 2,040
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
not statistically different. This results in higher profits generated in the non-profit treatment.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In the first essay of this dissertation, we investigate the impact of information about the MPCR
of a linear public good on contributions. The theoretical model predicts that information provision
has a differential impact on less and more generous groups. While information increases average
contributions by less generous subject groups, it reduces average contributions by more generous
subject groups. We experimentally test these hypotheses in the lab and the findings are in line with
the theoretical expectations. We find that information does not impact public good contribution
on the extensive margin. However, information impacts public good contributions on the intensive
margin and the sign of this impact depends on the generosity level of the sessions. In the relatively
selfish sessions, subjects who contributed at least once contribute more on average when they
are informed compared to when they are uninformed of the value of the public good. However,
just the opposite is true for the relatively generous sessions. In these sessions, subjects who are
potential contributors contribute less to the public good when they are informed. This is because
their relative response to bad news is greater than their response to good news.
The findings of this study have significant implications for fundraising. In particular, they sug-
gest that targeted information provision may be a more fruitful strategy of increasing public good
contributions than uniform information provision. Since donors themselves may be able to acquire
information by conducting research about non-profits prior to contributing, an important direction
for future research includes endogenizing the choice of information acquisition by donors. This
would allow us to glean further insight about the impact of information on public good provision
by studying how information acquisition incentives differ across donors.
Previous literature documents that people living under precarious conditions of scarcity tend
to make suboptimal economic and financial decisions. Motivated by this emerging literature, the
second essay studies the impact of scarcity on moral and pro-social behavior. In addition, we also
study the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism in cheating and pro-social behavior. Using a
lab-in-the-field experiment, we study cheating behavior across periods of Scarcity and Abundance.
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We find that scarcity does not affect participants’ cheating behavior for themselves. Our findings
suggest that cheating in an effort to increase the participant’s own well-being is not impacted by
the economic environment. However, we also find that people cheat for others even though they
do not directly benefit from it. While people cheat more for the in-group member relative to the
out-group member during the Abundance period, this in-group favoritism in cheating vanishes
during the Scarcity period. In fact, subjects do not cheat at all for the out-group member during
the Abundance period, but they cheat for the out-group member during scarcity.
In this study, we also use a dictator game to study in-group favoritism in pro-social behavior.
This allows us to examine the impact of scarcity on in-group favoritism when the cost of this
preferential treatment is monetary rather than moral. We find a similar pattern of behavior. While
subjects send significantly more to the in-group member during the Abundance period, this gap is
no longer statistically significant in the Scarcity period. Furthermore, the in-group favoritism in
pro-social behavior is swept away by an increase in giving to the out-group member rather than a
reduction in giving to the in-group member. Looking at the findings from both experimental games,
we conclude that scarcity eliminates in-group bias in terms of pro-social and moral behavior.
The third essay investigates whether workers exert more effort when they work for a mission-
oriented job using a modified gift-exchange experiment. We find that workers exert higher levels
of effort in the non-profit treatment only when the wages are high. For low wages, we do not find
a significant difference in effort levels between the two treatments. Interestingly, managers do not
respond to the treatment so the average wages paid across the two treatments are not statistically
different. This results in more profits being generated in the non-profit treatment at high wage
levels.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. To show that g(v) is increasing in v, note by eq. (4.3) that
g′(v) = −g(v) R
′(v)
1 +R(v)
(A.1)
Moreover, since βi ∼ Exp(1/λ), R(v) = 1−e
−β1(v)/λ
e−β2(v)/λ
. Therefore, differentiating R(v) with
respect to v yields
R′(v) =
1
λ
β′2(v)e
β2(v)/λ − 1
λ
[β′2(v)− β′1(v)] e(β2(v)−β1(v))/λ = (A.2)
= −N(N − 1)
(Nv − 1)2
1
λ
[
eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)
]
< 0
where the last equality takes into account that β′1(v) = −
N(N−1)
(Nv−1)2 < 0 and β
′
2(v) = −
N(N−1)
(Nv−1)2 (1+
γ) < 0. Given R′(v) < 0, eq. (A.1) implies that g′(v) > 0.
To show that limv→ 1
N
g(v) = 0, we need to show that limv→ 1
N
R(v) =∞. Note that limv→ 1
N
β1(v) =
limv→ 1
N
β2(v) =∞. Therefore, limv→ 1
N
e−β2(v)/λ = limv→ 1
N
e−β1(v)/λ = 0, resulting in limv→ 1
N
R(v) =
∞. To see that limv→1 g(v) = W note that limv→1 β1(v) = 0 and limv→1 β2(v) = γ. This implies
that limv→1R(v) = 0 and limv→1 g(v) = W .
To establish the existence and uniqueness of ṽ(λ) and its corresponding properties, we first
derive g′′(v) by differentiating g′(v) with respect to v, yielding
g′′(v) =
g(v)
(1 +R(v))
[
2
[R′(v)]2
1 +R(v)
−R′′(v)
]
(A.3)
Differentiating eq. (A.2) with respect to v and simplifying yields
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R′′(v) =
N2(N − 1)2
λ2(Nv − 1)4
[
(eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v))
(
2λ(Nv − 1)
(N − 1)
+ γ
)
+ (1 + γ)eβ2(v)/λ
]
(A.4)
Subsituting for R′(v) and R′′(v) in eq. (A.3) and simplifying results in
g′′(v) =
g(v)
(1 +R(v))
N2(N − 1)2
λ2(Nv − 1)4
[eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)]×[
2
eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)
1 +R(v)
− (1 + γ)e
β2(v)/λ
eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)
− 2λ(Nv − 1)
(N − 1)
− γ
]
Note that
g′′(v)
sign
=
[
2
eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)
1 +R(v)
− (1 + γ)e
β2(v)/λ
eβ2(v)/λ + γR(v)
− 2λ(Nv − 1)
(N − 1)
− γ
]
= Ω(v, λ).
To show the uniqueness of ṽ(λ), we first show that Ω(v, λ) is strictly decreasing in v, implying
that there is at most one solution to g′′(v) = 0. Substituting for R(v) in the above expression and
further simplifying yields
Ω(v, λ) = 2
1 + γ(1− e−β1(v)/λ)
1 + e−[β1(v)+β2(v)]/λ
− 1 + γ
1 + γ(1− e−β1(v)/λ)
− 2λ(Nv − 1)
(N − 1)
− γ (A.5)
It is immediately evident that Ω(v, λ) is strictly decreasing in v since β′1(v) < 0 and β
′
2(v) < 0.
Thus, there is at most one solution to Ω(v, λ) = 0.
To establish the existence of ṽ(λ), note that
lim
v→ 1
N
Ω(v, λ) = 1 + γ > 0, (A.6)
since limv→ 1
N
β1(v) = limv→ 1
N
β2(v) =∞, and
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lim
v→1
Ω(v, λ) =
2
1 + e−λ/γ
− 2/λ− 1, (A.7)
since limv→1 β1(v) = 0 and limv→1 β2(v) = γ. It is straightforward to verify that limv→1 Ω(v, λ)
is strictly decreasing in λ and takes negative values for all λ > λ̃ where λ̃ ∈ (0,∞) solves
lim
v→1
Ω(v, λ̃) = 0.
Thus, for λ > λ̃, ṽ(λ) uniquely solves Ω(ṽ(λ), λ) = 0 and ṽ(λ) ∈ ( 1
N
, 1), while for λ < λ̃,
Ω(v, λ) > 0 for all v ∈ ( 1
N
, 1) and thus ṽ(λ) = 1. This establishes the existence of a unique
ṽ(λ) ∈
(
1
N
, 1
]
with g′′(v) > 0 for v < ṽ(λ) and g′′(v) < 0 for v > ṽ, proving property 1).
To establish property 2, note first that for λ < λ̃ ṽ(λ) = 1. For λ > λ̃ implicit differentiation
of Ω(ṽ(λ), λ) = 0 results in
ṽ′(λ) = −∂Ω(v, λ)/∂λ
∂Ω(v, λ)/∂v
Recall that ∂Ω(v, λ)/∂v < 0. Moreover, straighforward differentiation reveals that ∂Ω(v, λ)/∂λ <
0. Therefore, it follows immediately that ṽ′(λ) < 0.
The property limλ→0 ṽ(λ) = 1 follow immediately from the fact that ṽ(λ) = 1 for λ < λ̃ ∈
(0,∞).
Finally, to establish that limλ→∞ ṽ(λ) = 1N , note that
lim
λ→∞
Ω(v, λ) = lim
λ→∞
−2Nv − 1
N − 1
λ
By definition, Ω(ṽ(λ), λ) = 0 for λ > λ̃. Therefore,
lim
λ→∞
Ω(ṽ(λ), λ) = lim
λ→∞
−2Nṽ(λ)− 1
N − 1
λ = 0 =⇒ lim
λ→∞
ṽ(λ) =
1
N
Proof of Proposition 1. Given 1
N
< vL < vH < 1, by Lemma 1, there exist λ1 > 0 be such that
77
ṽ(λ1) = vH and λ2 > λ1 such that ṽ(λ2) = vL. Furthermore, by Lemma 1, g(v) is convex for all
v < vH if λ ≤ λ1. Thus, by definition of convexity,
pLg(vL) + pHg(vH) > g(pLvL + pHvH)
Analogously, for λ ≥ λ2, g(v) is concave for all v ≥ vL, implying the reverse inequality.
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Figure B.1: Distributions of Payoffs Reported in Cheating Game Treatments
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Figure B.2: Distributions of Amount Sent in Dictator Game Treatments
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Figure B.3: Frequency Distributions of Worker Effort Provided Across Low Wages and Treatments
(a) Profit-Wage: 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(b) Non Profit-Wage: 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(c) Profit-Wage: 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(d) Non Profit-Wage: 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(e) Profit-Wage: 30
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
(f) Non Profit-Wage: 30
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
81
Figure B.4: Frequency Distributions of Worker Effort Provided Across High Wages and Treat-
ments
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APPENDIX C
TABLES
Table C.1: Comparing Subjects who Participated in Scarcity Only vs. Both Periods
Variable Scarcity Only Both Periods p-value
Female 0.27 (0.45) 0.41 (0.50) 0.1463†
Yearly Income 9,174 (7,906) 8,242 (7,794) 0.5531‡
Main Source of Income Coffee 0.97 (0.18) 0.94 (0.23) 0.5732 †
Finances Relative to Others 2.23 (0.43) 2.19 (0.57) 0.8219‡
Household Financial Situation 2.69 (0.65) 2.87 (0.61) 0.1595‡
No Money Index 2.22 (1.41) 2.17 (1.35) 0.9599 ‡
No Money for Food 0.41 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.9791 †
No Money for Basic Needs (non-food) 0.38 (0.49) 0.57 (0.50) 0.0536 †
No Money for Medical Expenses 0.56 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.3954 †
No Money for Farm 0.88 (0.34) 0.73 (0.45) 0.0807 †
Credit 0.19 (0.40) 0.17 (0.38) 0.8002†
Risk 3.16 (1.80) 2.91 (1.58) 0.5886 ‡
Stress Index 1.89 (0.48) 1.92 (0.46) 0.6019 ‡
Celebratory Events 0.78 (0.42) 0.82 (0.39) 0.6165 †
Cheating for Self 0.82 (0.39) 0.85 (0.36) 0.6261 †
Cheating for In Group 0.76 (0.44) 0.74 (0.44) 0.8672 †
Cheating for Out Group 0.58 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.2748 †
Dictator Giving -In Group 11.34 (7.38) 10.52 (6.38) 0.5758‡
Dictator Giving -Out Group 11.47 (6.22) 9.36 (6.61) 0.0969‡
Number of Subjects 31-33 97-109
†Two-sample test of proportions. ‡Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
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Table C.2: Description of the Survey Measures and Risk Preferences
Variables Description
Finances Relative to Others 1-Better, 2-Similar, 3-Worse
Household Financial Situation 1-Excellent, 2-Good, 3-Not so good, 4-Poor
No Money Index Summation of the following four
No Money for Food 1-Experienced this situation in the last month,
0-otherwise
No Money for Basic Needs (non-food) 1-Experienced this situation in the last month,
0-otherwise
No Money for Medical Expenses 1-Experienced this situation in the last month,
0-otherwise
No Money for Farm 1-Experienced this situation in the last month,
0-otherwise
Credit 1- took a credit/loan in the last 6 months
0- otherwise
Stress Index Average of answers to ten stress related questions
(Cohen et al., 1983)
Celebratory Events 1- attended/organized a wedding or a celebratory
event in the last month, 0- otherwise
Risk Scale: 1 (risk averse) -6 (risk lover)
Incentivized Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008)
Gamble Task
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Table C.3: Survey Measures of Financial Situation Across Abundance and Scarcity Periods
Variable Abundance Scarcity p-value
Finances Relative to Others 2.19 (0.55) 2.19 (0.57) 1.0000‡
Household Financial Situation 2.58 (0.78) 2.87 (0.61) 0.0002‡
No Money Index 1.71 (1.46) 2.17 (1.35) 0.0041 ‡
No Money for Food 0.26 (0.44) 0.40 (0.49) 0.0061†
No Money for Basic Needs (non-food) 0.44 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.0433†
No Money for Medical Expenses 0.41 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.2623†
No Money for Farm 0.60 (0.49) 0.73 (0.45) 0.0348†
†McNemar’s Chi Square test. ‡Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.This table includes all 109 participants who participated
in both periods. However, not all participants provided an answer to all questions. Thus, the
number of observations ranges between 97 and 109 depending on the period and the question.
Table C.4: Other Survey Measures and Risk Across Abundance and Scarcity Periods
Variable Abundance Scarcity p-value
Stress Index 1.91 (0.60) 1.92 (0.46) 0.5251‡
Credit 0.92 (0.28) 0.83 (0.38) 0.1336†
Celebratory Events 0.77 (0.43) 0.82 (0.39) 0.4142†
Risk 3.10 (1.93) 2.91 (1.58) 0.5311‡
†McNemar’s Chi Square test. ‡Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.This table includes all 109 participants who participated
in both periods. However, not all participants provided an answer to all questions. Thus, the
number of observations ranges between 97 and 109 depending on the period and the question.
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Table C.5: Tobit Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Worker Effort
Wage 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(0.00154) (0.00135) (0.00134)
Non Profit 0.000906 0.00178 0.368∗
(0.0824) (0.0730) (0.201)
Wage*Non Profit 0.00258 0.00238 0.00236
(0.00198) (0.00180) (0.00171)
Period -0.00766∗∗∗ -0.00767∗∗∗
(0.00154) (0.00134)
Female -0.0848 -0.0666
(0.0555) (0.0469)
Society Oriented 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0376)
Society Oriented*Non Profit -0.0964∗
(0.0504)
Constant -0.188∗∗∗ -0.0724 -0.491∗∗∗
(0.0611) (0.0636) (0.149)
Observations 2040 2040 2040
Robust errors standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Panel Data Tobit Regression Results Using the First 15 Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV: Worker Effort
Wage 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(0.00135) (0.00140) (0.00158)
High Wage (40-60) 0.317∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0344) (0.0292)
Non Profit -0.0474 -0.0559 0.291 0.0560 0.0486 0.402∗∗
(0.0804) (0.0958) (0.192) (0.0514) (0.0475) (0.173)
Wage*Non Profit 0.00368∗ 0.00369∗ 0.00366∗∗
(0.00201) (0.00208) (0.00186)
High Wage*Non Profit 0.0855∗ 0.0858∗ 0.0849∗
(0.0474) (0.0448) (0.0468)
Period -0.00552∗∗∗ -0.00553∗∗∗ -0.00519∗∗∗ -0.00520∗∗∗
(0.00172) (0.00166) (0.00189) (0.00191)
Female -0.0936∗ -0.0770 -0.0855∗∗ -0.0687
(0.0548) (0.0476) (0.0396) (0.0439)
Society Oriented 0.100∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0357)
Society Oriented*Non Profit -0.0911∗∗ -0.0932∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0410)
Constant -0.138∗∗ -0.0439 -0.430∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ -0.153
(0.0568) (0.0615) (0.184) (0.0373) (0.0460) (0.152)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
Robust errors standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX D
SIMULATION PROCEDURE TO ASSESS THE ACCURACY OF THE SAMPLE SIZE TO
GENERATE RANDOM DISTRIBUTION
The Simulation Procedure:
• Step 1: Given our sample size of 109 subjects, we first draw 109 random integers be-
tween 1-6 (i.e., virtual die roll).
• Step 2: We test whether the distribution of the random draws differs from a categorical
random uniform distribution using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit test.
• Step 3: We repeat the procedure in Steps 1 and 2 1000 times.
• Step 4: We record the number of times out of 1000 simulations that the distributions
were indeed categorical random uniform.
• Step 5: We compute a statistical inference measure which is the number of simulations
resulting in non-random distributions divided by the total number of simulations.
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